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I. INTRODUCTION 
Listen closely.  You will hear a low but audible buzz within 
America’s labor movement.  At a time when the labor movement is 
sliding downhill,1 it may have found a useful foothold among a most 
unlikely group of women workers: family child care providers who, from 
within their private homes, care for children for compensation.2  Over the 
past few years, organized labor has reached out to these workers and, in 
the process, has confounded traditional thinking about unions and their 
responsiveness to the needs of women.  Not very long ago, it seemed 
unimaginable that unions would cast their fortunes with family child care 
providers (“FCC providers”), and yet, in 2005, the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) organized more than 49,000 providers, 
netting organized labor in the United States its second largest victory 
since 1941.3 
This Article examines the legal struggle to organize and represent 
FCC providers who provide publicly subsidized care.4  The success and 
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 1. Thomas B. Edsall, Labor’s Divisions Widen as Membership Declines, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 
2005, at A2; Steven Greenhouse, Splintered, But Unbowed, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at C1; 
Robert B. Reich, Divided, They’ll Stand—Maybe Even Taller, WASH. POST, July 31, 2005, at B4. 
 2. As ninety-eight percent of all child care workers, including family child care providers, are 
women, I refer to them as such throughout the Article.  See infra Part III.A (reviewing the 
demographic composition of the child care labor force). 
 3. See infra Part VI.B (discussing the organization of FCC providers in Illinois). 
 4. As used in this Article, an FCC provider refers to an individual who provides child care 
services for compensation in her own residence to two or more unrelated children.  See, e.g., KATIE 
HAMM & AVIS JONES-DEWEEVER, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, FAMILY CHILD CARE: 
RECENT TRENDS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 1 (2004), available at http://www.kwdi.re.kr/data/wotrend2/ 
family_child_care_trends.pdf (defining an FCC provider “as a paid provider who cares for two or 
more unrelated children in her home, although the provider may care for her own children at the 
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struggles of the SEIU are not without precedent.5  The organization of 
family child care is part and parcel of labor’s growing emphasis on low-
wage service jobs.6  Organized FCC providers join the ranks of other 
low-wage service workers, including clerical staff,7 janitors,8 and home 
care workers,9 all of whom are contributing to labor’s struggle to retain 
                                                                                                                       
same time”).  FCC providers are not a monolithic group.  Some providers are regulated while others 
are not, and a significant percentage of providers escape all government oversight by operating as 
part of an underground economy.  See infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text (discussing 
distinctions among FCC providers).  While the Article discusses issues that affect FCC providers as 
a group, the focus on unionization is limited to those providers who provide publicly subsidized 
care. 
 5. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) is also 
involved in organizing FCC providers.  See, e.g., Dave DeWitte, AFSCME Claims Child-Care Win, 
GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), Feb. 7, 2006, at 1B (discussing the competition between SEIU and 
AFSCME to represent Iowa child care workers); Jennifer Jacobs, Unionizing Child Care Workers 
Applauded, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 18, 2006, at 1B (same); Francine Knowles, Two Unions Clash 
Over Which One Will Represent Child-Care Workers, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at 74 
(discussing “turf battle” between SEIU and AFSCME for representation of Illinois child care 
workers). 
 In organizing FCC providers, SEIU and AFSCME have worked closely with community 
organizing groups such as ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now) and 
DARE (Direct Action for Rights and Equality).  See Maria D. Montilla et al., Models for Increasing 
Child Care Worker Compensation, in CHARTING CIVIL SOCIETY, at 4 (Urban Inst., No. 8, June 
2001), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/cnp_8.pdf (discussing DARE’s successful 
campaign to get the state of Rhode Island to extend health coverage insurance to child care workers); 
MARCY WHITEBOOK, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF CHILD CARE EMPLOYMENT, WORKING FOR WORTHY 
WAGES: THE CHILD CARE COMPENSATION MOVEMENT, 1970–2001, at 46 (2002), available at 
http://www.iir.berkeley.edu/cscce/pdf/worthywages.pdf (discussing SEIU’s coalition with ACORN 
to organize child care workers).  Along with the focus on FCC providers, unions are also pushing to 
organize center-based child care workers.  See Peggie R. Smith, Caring for Paid Caregivers: 
Linking Quality Child Care with Improved Working Conditions, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 399, 426–28 
(2004) (case study of center-based child care unionizing in Seattle). 
 6. See, e.g., Fernando Gapasin & Michael Yates, Organizing the Unorganized: Will Promises 
Become Practices?, MONTHLY REV., July–Aug. 1997, at 46, 46–48, 51 (noting the decline of unions 
and opportunities to increase union density through organizing service workers); Pamela M. Prah, 
Labor Unions’ Future, 15 CQ RESEARCHER 711, 713–17 (2005) (discussing the role unions play in 
the current economy and what the labor movement should focus on in the future); Symposium, Split 
to Win? Assessing the State of the Labor Movement, DISSENT, Winter 2006, at 54, 54–60 (discussing 
the benefits to the labor movement of focusing on the service sector); Jeffrey M. Barker, Health 
Care Union Makes Major Push into Politics, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 7, 2004, at B1 
(observing that “SEIU has consistently looked to low-wage service sectors to increase its 
membership”). 
 7. See Richard W. Hurd & Adrienne McElwain, Organizing Clerical Workers: Determinants 
of Success, 41 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 360, 367–72 (1988) (analyzing the factors affecting the 
success of union organizing among clerical workers in the private sector). 
 8. See Richard W. Hurd & William Rouse, Progressive Union Organizing: The SEIU Justice 
for Janitors Campaign, 21 REV. RADICAL POLITICAL ECON. 70, 73 (1989) (“[T]he Justice for 
Janitors campaign has experienced some success in increasing union membership and in 
consolidating wage gains and benefits.”); Roger Waldinger et al., Helots No More: A Case Study of 
the Justice for Janitors Campaign in Los Angeles, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON 
UNION STRATEGIES 102 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) (analyzing “the recent growth of 
janitorial unionism in Los Angeles”). 
 9. See JANET HEINRITZ-CANTERBURY, PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., 
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social currency, and who, in turn, have seen their own economic fortunes 
improve.  Yet more so than any of these other groups, the mobilization of 
FCC providers demonstrates labor’s willingness to rethink conventional 
union approaches in an effort to organize the unorganized.  Viewed as 
babysitters by many,10 the women who comprise the family child care 
workforce sharply contrast with labor’s historical focus on blue-collar, 
male factory workers.11 
America’s child care problem provides the backdrop for the 
organization of FCC providers.  Far too many working parents, with too 
few dollars, lack access to affordable, quality child care.12  As welfare 
reform pushes former welfare recipients into the workforce, the problem 
has escalated.13  Not only are more parents in need of child care, but 
quality concerns have grown because unlicensed FCC providers deliver 
the bulk of publicly subsidized child care in many low-income 
communities.14  While this state of affairs has generated demands for 
                                                                                                                       
COLLABORATING TO IMPROVE IN-HOME SUPPORTIVE SERVICES: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES ON 
IMPLEMENTING CALIFORNIA’S PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 4–6 (2002), available at http://www. 
paraprofessional.org/publications/CA%20PA%20Report.pdf (summarizing organization and 
progress of California’s In-Home Supportive Services Program); Linda Delp & Katie Quan, 
Homecare Worker Organizing in California: An Analysis of a Successful Strategy, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 
1, 18 (2002) (“[T]he homecare organizing campaign . . . had economic and social significance far 
beyond organizing.”). 
Home care refers to services provided to disabled and elderly individuals that enable them to 
live independently in their own homes.  Such services include housekeeping, cooking, shopping, and 
assistance with personal hygiene such as bathing.  See infra note 117 and accompanying text 
(discussing home care). 
 10. See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., EVERYBODY’S CHILDREN: CHILD CARE AS A PUBLIC 
PROBLEM 59 (1995) (observing that “many parents continue to think of providers as ‘babysitters’ 
despite vigorous efforts to purge that word from the child care vocabulary”); CAROLINE ZINSSER, 
RAISED IN EAST URBAN: CHILD CARE CHANGES IN A WORKING CLASS COMMUNITY 2 (1991) 
(referring to FCC providers as babysitters).  See generally MARY TUOMINEN, WE ARE NOT 
BABYSITTERS: FAMILY CHILD CARE PROVIDERS REDEFINE WORK AND CARE (2003) (arguing for a 
reconceptualization of the social and economic value of FCC providers’ work). 
 11. Charles B. Craver, Why Labor Unions Must [and Can] Survive, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
15, 25 (1998) (observing that the “labor movement historically has derived its organizational 
strength from white, male, blue-collar employees residing in northern states”); Molly S. McUsic & 
Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339, 1344 
(1997) (commenting that the model worker targeted by unions reflected the image of white, married, 
male industrial workers); Dorian T. Warren & Cathy J. Cohen, Organizing at the Intersection of 
Labor and Civil Rights: A Case Study of New Haven, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 629, 632–33 (2000) 
(observing that the traditional model of organizing, which focused mainly on the concerns of white 
men, poses a challenge for organizing the disproportionate numbers of racial-ethnic groups and 
women in the service-sector workforce). 
 12. See SUZANNE HELBURN & BARBARA BERGMANN, AMERICA’S CHILD CARE PROBLEM: THE 
WAY OUT 4–6 (2003) (discussing generally the “affordability problem” and the “quality problem”). 
 13. See infra notes 29–49 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of welfare reform on 
the demand for child care). 
 14. TUOMINEN, supra note 10, at 134 (noting, in reference to the family child care study that 
she conducted, “in lower-income communities and communities of color, state-subsidized children 
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increased government regulation of family child care,15 it has also 
prompted providers to mobilize. 
FCC providers clearly operated as self-employed members of a 
cottage industry in years past,16 but today they are more likely to view 
their work in the context of an employment relationship with the 
government if they care for children receiving publicly funded child care.  
In such instances, providers are subject to government regulations and 
are paid by the state;17 yet the compensation rarely affords providers 
decent wages.18  Indeed, government payments are so low that women 
who provide subsidized child care often qualify for such care for their 
own children.19  Remedying this situation has proven difficult, in part 
because collective bargaining statutes deny FCC providers the right to 
join forces in order to negotiate with government agencies over the terms 
of their labor arrangements.  However, innovative unionizing approaches 
are beginning to alter this landscape. 
The remainder of this Article is divided into five Parts.  Together, 
Parts II and III pour the Article’s foundation and build the necessary 
framework for the ensuing examination of labor’s efforts to organize and 
represent FCC providers.  Part II unpacks the significance of welfare 
reform to family child care and overviews government regulation of 
family child care.  Part III examines the economic status of FCC 
providers and considers how government reimbursement rates, designed 
to compensate providers for the delivery of subsidized child care, serve 
to reinforce their economic vulnerability. 
Parts IV, V, and VI turn to the unionization of FCC providers.  All 
three Parts draw upon the SEIU’s campaign to organize home care 
workers given the close structural and funding similarities between home 
care20 and family child care.  Part IV highlights the practical hurdles 
impeding the organization of FCC providers, such as worker 
                                                                                                                       
formed the majority of children served by the providers”); see also infra notes 51–57 and 
accompanying text (discussing the poor quality in family child care). 
 15. See infra notes 59–67 and accompanying text (discussing various regulatory frameworks 
for family child care and overviewing government regulation of family child care). 
 16. See SONYA MICHEL, CHILDREN’S INTERESTS/MOTHERS’ RIGHTS: THE SHAPING OF 
AMERICA’S CHILD CARE POLICY 262–63 (1999) (suggesting an evolution of family child care over 
time from a point where FCC providers regarded themselves as babysitters and eschewed 
professionalism, to a point where some providers desired to become professionals and various 
groups began to emphasize the need for greater government regulation). 
 17. See infra notes 59–67 and accompanying text (overviewing government regulation of 
family child care). 
 18. See infra Part III.B (evaluating the process by which governments determine child care 
reimbursement rates). 
 19. TUOMINEN, supra note 10, at 8, 176. 
 20. See infra notes 117–18, 123–30 and accompanying text (discussing home care). 
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fragmentation and parents’ limited financial resources.  The question of 
whether providers are employees or independent contractors for purposes 
of collective bargaining statutes forms the heart of Part V.  This Part 
analyzes case law addressing the question and discusses the limitations 
of the control test, as applied to FCC providers, to determine who is and 
is not an employee.  Finally, Part VI explores an employer-of-record 
approach to organize and represent FCC providers.  Premised on the 
state-action exemption to antitrust law, this approach provided the 
winning strategy that led to the organization of FCC providers in Illinois. 
II. FAMILY CHILD CARE: AN OVERVIEW 
The demand for child care has grown steadily as increasing numbers 
of women with children enter the workforce.21  Between 1947 and 2004, 
the labor force participation rate of mothers with children between six 
and seventeen years of age climbed from roughly twenty-five percent to 
more than seventy-seven percent.22  As a result of this upward trend, the 
provision of child care has changed dramatically.  Whereas families once 
relied heavily upon “mother care” provided by stay-at-home moms, 
today more and more parents of young children are turning to a host of 
“other care” arrangements, including in-home care, relative care, family 
child care, group home care, and child care centers.23 
It is difficult to calculate the number of child care workers in the 
United States and the settings in which they work because many workers 
are unregulated.  The child care workforce is probably larger than the 1.3 
million workers reported by the Department of Labor.24  Much of the 
underreporting occurs with respect to home-based child care because of 
                                                     
 21. See STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 108TH CONG., 2004 GREEN BOOK 9-1 
(Comm. Print 2004) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK], available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/ 
media/pdf/greenbook2003/Section9.pdf (discussing child care and observing that the “dramatic 
increase in the labor force participation of mothers is the most important factor affecting the demand 
for child care”). 
 22. Id. at 9-2; see also, Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Status of 
the Population by Sex, Marital Status, and Presence and Age of Own Children Under 18, 2004–05 
Employment Annual Averages (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.t05.htm 
(illustrating the 2004 “participation rate” for women “with own children 6 to 17 years, none 
younger”). 
 23. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-786, CHILD CARE: STATE EFFORTS TO 
ENFORCE SAFETY AND HEALTH REQUIREMENTS 6 (2004) [hereinafter CHILD CARE: STATE EFFORTS] 
(describing “[t]ypes of child care eligible to receive funding under TANF and the block grant”). 
 24. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 2006–07 OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK 
HANDBOOK: CHILD CARE WORKERS 389, 391 (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/pdf/ 
ocos170.pdf. 
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its location within the private setting.25  While precise numbers remain 
elusive, a recent study conducted by the Center for the Child Care 
Workforce, focusing on the care of very young children (ages zero to 
five), represents one of the more thorough attempts to fully capture the 
size and character of the workforce.26  The study estimates that 2.3 
million workers care for very young children at any given moment and 
that family child care is the most popular form of nonparental, 
nonrelative care.27  Family child care has become so vital to working 
parents that, in many areas, it is the fastest growing segment of the child 
care industry.28 
Arguably, the most critical force fueling family child care’s growth 
is welfare reform legislation.  In 1996, Congress passed the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).29  
The PRWORA eliminated the entitlement to federal child care assistance 
under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)30 and replaced 
                                                     
 25. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WHO CARES FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN? 151 (Cheryl D. 
Hayes et al. eds., 1990) (observing that “[s]ince many family day care providers operate in the 
underground economy . . . precise estimates of their numbers and the number of children they serve 
are illusive”). 
 26. See CTR. FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE & HUMAN SERVS. POLICY CTR., ESTIMATING 
THE SIZE AND COMPONENTS OF THE U.S. CHILD CARE WORKFORCE AND CAREGIVING POPULATION 
3 (2002) [hereinafter ESTIMATING CHILD CARE WORKFORCE], available at http://www. 
ccw.cleverspin.com/pubs/workforceestimatereport.pdf (finding that “the economic and social 
contribution of child care workers and the projected future need for child care workers . . . have been 
seriously underestimated”). 
 27. See id. at 2 (reporting that of the 2.3 million workers, twenty-four percent work in center-
based settings, “including private and public child care centers, Head Start programs, and pre-
kindergarten programs”; twenty-eight percent are FCC providers; thirty-five percent “are paid 
relatives other than family child care providers”; and thirteen percent “are paid non-relatives other 
than those working in centers or family child care programs (e.g., nannies)”). 
 28. See AMY R. GILLMAN, SURDNA FOUNDATION, STRENGTHENING FAMILY CHILD CARE IN 
LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 3 (2001), available at http://www.surdna.org/usr_doc/childcare.pdf 
(stating that “[f]amily child care is the fastest-growing segment of the child care industry and 
represents the most frequently used ‘out of home’ care in the country”); Tracie McMillan, Market 
Babies, CITY LIMITS, Jan. 2003, at 20, 21 (observing that in New York City, “family child care has 
been the fastest-growing kind of regulated care the city pays for, increasing by roughly 38 percent 
between 1998 and 2002”); see also Jamaal Abdul-Alim, Rapid Growth of Day Cares Leaves 
Oversight Behind, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 18, 2003, at 01A (observing in the context of 
Milwaukee County that “[t]he largest growth in the day care field has occurred in the number of 
state-licensed family child care centers”); Michele R. Marcucci, Bay Area Child Care in Short 
Supply, Expensive, OAKLAND TRIB., Feb. 7, 2002 (with respect to California, commenting that 
“most of the growth statewide is in smaller, family child-care homes, rather than larger centers”); 
Katherine Yung, A Lost Child, a Lost Livelihood; Child Care Tragedy Underscores High Stakes 
Regulators Face, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 3, 2002, at 1H (noting that family child care is “the 
fastest-growing form of child care in Texas”). 
 29. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 42 
U.S.C.). 
 30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–17 (1995), repealed by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–19) 
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it with a block grant program known as Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF).31  Unlike AFDC, which provided benefits to low-
income families as long as they had children under the age of eighteen32 
and satisfied state-specified income levels,33 TANF limits benefit 
eligibility to a lifetime total of five years34 and imposes a work 
requirement on benefit recipients.35  According to the conservative 
estimate of one study, welfare reform prompted the movement of at least 
one million children into child care settings during the period from 1996 
to 1998.36  To help respond to the child care needs of welfare-to-work 
recipients entering the labor force, state and local governments 
throughout the country have promoted family child care.37 
Family child care is an important child care option.  Some parents 
prefer to place young children in family child care rather than in child 
care centers38 because of its family setting and location within individual 
                                                                                                                       
(2000) (stating that the purpose of the TANF “is to increase the flexibility of states in operating” 
child care programs). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–19 (2000). 
 32. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1995), repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (defining 
“dependent child” as one who is under the age of eighteen). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1995), repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2000). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2000). 
 36. See Bruce Fuller et al., Welfare Reform and Child Care Options for Low-Income Families, 
12 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 97, 102 (2002) (“This estimate may be conservative, as it includes only 
families who were enrolled in work activities and those employed about a year after leaving welfare.  
Also, the estimate did not include the increasing number of older children who began spending time 
at home alone after school while their mothers were still at work.”); see also MARIA L. HEIN ET AL., 
INST. FOR SOC. & ECON. DEV., HOME-BASED CHILD CARE: ASSESSING THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
POTENTIAL 1 (1999), available at http://www.ised.us/doc/Home%20Based%20Child%20Care.pdf 
(“The demand for subsidized child care services is increasing as a result of welfare reform and its 
work requirements.”); COLLEEN HENRY ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, CHILD 
CARE SUBSIDIES PROMOTE MOTHERS’ EMPLOYMENT AND CHILDREN’S DEVELOPMENT 3 (2003), 
available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/G714.pdf (“The need for child care assistance has been 
amplified by the 1996 welfare reform legislation’s emphasis on increasing work participation for 
welfare recipients.  The reforms have significantly increased the labor force participation of welfare 
receivers, resulting in a sharply expanded need for child care services.”). 
 37. See GILLMAN, supra note 28, at i (“With the advent of welfare reform, family child care has 
been touted by policymakers and others as a cost-effective way to quickly create employment 
opportunities and expand the child care supply in low-income communities.”). 
Policymakers have also encouraged welfare-to-work recipients to become child care workers, 
including FCC providers, notwithstanding the substandard working conditions that prevail in the 
field.  See HEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 1 (“A popular notion in many states is to encourage welfare 
recipients to become child care providers in order to meet the demand for child care and provide an 
avenue to self-sufficiency.”); McMillan, supra note 28, at 21–23 (highlighting problems associated 
with turning welfare-to-work recipients into FCC providers); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
WELFARE REFORM: STATES’ EFFORTS TO EXPAND CHILD CARE PROGRAMS 20 (1998), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98027.pdf (observing that states “are funding efforts to support 
and encourage the entrance of new child care providers into the market”). 
 38. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASED WORK 
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homes.39  Relative to center-based care, parents often view family child 
care as nurturing and warm.40  Unlike the supposed rigidity associated 
with center care, the family atmosphere is thought to enhance 
opportunities for spontaneity.41  In addition, family child care offers the 
appeal of having one consistent caregiver whereas center-based care is 
often delivered by many different caregivers.42  Likewise, a family care 
setting frequently affords greater one-on-one attention as the adult-child 
ratio is generally lower than that in child care centers.43 
For the majority of former welfare recipients, family child care also 
provides flexibility, convenience, and affordability when compared with 
center-based child care.  Because low-income parents are 
disproportionately concentrated in jobs that demand night or weekend 
work, they require child care that will accommodate nontraditional work 
                                                                                                                       
PARTICIPATION FOR CHILD CARE 7 (1997) [hereinafter  INCREASED WORK PARTICIPATION] (“Many 
mothers with children under the age of 2 who work full time place their children in the care of a 
family child care provider as opposed to a center or in-home setting.  For example, in 1993, 40 
percent of children under 1 year of age whose mothers worked were cared for in a provider’s home; 
38 percent of children between 1 and 2 were also cared for in this setting.”); ELLEN GALINSKY, ET 
AL., THE STUDY OF CHILDREN IN FAMILY CHILD CARE AND RELATIVE CARE: HIGHLIGHTS OF 
FINDINGS 1 (1994) (commenting that “[c]are in the home of the provider is the most prevalent form 
of child care for young children with employed mothers in the United States today”); HAMM & 
JONES-DEWEEVER, supra note 4, at 1 (“Infants and toddlers are more likely than older children to be 
placed in family child care homes.”). 
 39. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 153 (“Among parents who prefer family day 
care, it is the intimacy of a small group and a home environment as well as a sense of shared values 
with the caregiver that are important.” (citation omitted)).  Some commentators suggest that much of 
the preference for family child care reflects an underlying emphasis on trust.  See HAMM & JONES-
DEWEEVER, supra note 4, at 1 (referencing research which “suggests that some mothers, particularly 
low-income and minority mothers, are more likely to trust relatives, friends or home-based providers 
who they can get to know on a more personal basis”); see also Fuller et al., supra note 36, at 104 
(observing that welfare-to-work recipients often “trust kin members or friends more than center-
based caregivers because kith and kin offer familiar child-rearing practices and speak their 
language”). 
 40. See HAMM & JONES-DEWEEVER, supra note 4, at 1 (commenting that the “idea of . . . a 
small, nurturing setting where siblings are grouped together is appealing to some parents” and that 
“some mothers may prefer a provider who shares similar cultural values or ideas about childrearing 
as opposed to a child care center where children may encounter multiple providers and policies that 
do not necessarily adhere to their own values”); MICHEL, supra note 16, at 262 (“[F]amily caregivers 
tended to attract clients . . . who expressed a preference for an environment that was ‘warmer’ and 
‘more homelike’ than what was available at child care centers . . . .”). 
 41. TUOMINEN, supra note 10, at 60. 
 42. See id. at 62 (reporting observation of FCC provider who states that “‘one part of [center-
based] child care I’ve never liked is the fact that people aren’t concerned enough about who’s 
handling that child and how often.  Is it five or six people handling the child?  Or is there just one 
main person who takes care of that child?  I think children need that [one main person] because not 
only do they need to bond with their parents, they need a type of bonding with their caregiver.’” 
(alterations in original)). 
 43. See id.  (reporting the observation of one FCC provider: “‘Individual attention.  Quiet time.  
Interaction with a limited number of people.  Long-term relationships.  These are all qualities that 
family child care providers value and see as essential to their provision of care.’”). 
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schedules.44  Compared with center-based care, family child care is more 
likely to afford parents the necessary flexibility to balance work 
obligations with parenting responsibilities.45  In addition, because there 
exists a dearth of center-based child care in poor communities,46 and 
because many low-income parents do not have ready access to 
transportation,47 family child care located in their neighborhoods 
                                                     
 44. See, e.g., ANN M. COLLINS ET AL., ABT. ASSOCS., INC., NATIONAL STUDY OF CHILD CARE 
FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 89 (2000), available at http://www.abtassoc.com/reports/NSCCLIF.pdf 
(“The most frequently reported [child care] shortage was in care offered for non-traditional hours, 
i.e., evenings, nights, weekends, holidays, as well as care that accommodates variable and swing 
shifts.  For families leaving welfare, and for other low-income families, this is often the kind of care 
that their work schedules require.”); HAMM & JONES-DEWEEVER, supra note 4, at 1 (observing that 
many “low-income women in the aftermath of welfare reform . . . have jobs requiring shift work”); 
Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1694 (2001) (“The terms and conditions of many low-income jobs (e.g., 
unusual hours, nontraditional jobs) make the task of finding such childcare especially difficult, if not 
impossible.”); Margy Waller, Welfare-to-Work and Child Care: A Survey of the Ten Big States, 1997 
PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST. 2, available at http://www.ppionline.org/documents/welfare_childcare 
.pdf (“Most child care providers are available only during traditional work hours, while poor 
working mothers in entry level positions often need odd-hours child care because their new jobs do 
not have 9-to-5 work day hours.”). 
 45. See HAMM & JONES-DEWEEVER, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that “[w]hereas child care 
centers tend to operate only during traditional business hours, family child care providers are much 
more likely to provide care at other times”); Juliet Bromer & Julia R. Henly, Child Care as Family 
Support: Caregiving Practices Across Child Care Providers, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 
941, 947 (2004) (observing that relative to center-based child care programs, “[h]ome-based child 
care settings offer a greater range of hours and provide more flexibility to incorporate part-time, full-
time, and variable parental work schedules”); Melissa Wavelet & Jacquie Anderson, Promoting Self-
Sufficiency: What We Know About Sustaining Employment and Increasing Income Among Welfare 
Recipients and the Working Poor, 22 FOCUS 56, 56 (2002) (noting that “those who leave cash 
assistance for work tend to have low retention rates, and employment is often intermittent, at 
nontraditional hours (evenings, weekends), and without a fixed schedule”). 
 46. See Claire Huntington, Welfare Reform and Child Care: A Proposal for State Legislation, 6 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 113 (1996) (noting the shortage of center-based child care in low-
income neighborhoods); Diane Hirshberg, Child Care Demand & Supply under CalWORKs: The 
Early Impacts of Welfare Reform for California’s Children, 1998–2000, at 2 (Policy Analysis for 
Cal. Educ., Working Paper No. 02-3, 2002), available at http://pace.berkeley.edu/wp_02-3.pdf 
(observing that “[t]he distribution of licensed centers is not equitable across communities.  A greater 
supply of center-based care is found both in affluent neighborhoods and in communities where the 
average educational attainment of parents is higher”). 
 47. See Ann Collins & Barbara Reisman, Child Care Under the Family Support Act: 
Guarantee, Quasi-Entitlement, or Paper Promise?, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 203, 208 (1993) 
(noting that “difficulties such as not owning an automobile or lack of accessible public transportation 
can make traveling from the home to the child-care site and to the worksite very complicated”); Erin 
Holland, From Welfare to Work: What the 1996 Welfare Reform Initiative Has Meant for Children, 
11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 115, 121 (2004) (observing that “low-income inner-city 
residents, who often do not own their own vehicles, face difficult employment choices”); Martin 
Wachs & Brian D. Taylor, Can Transportation Strategies Help Meet the Welfare Challenge?, 64 J. 
AM. PLANNING ASS’N. 15, 16 (1998) (observing “that dependence on public transit reduced 
employment access far more than did any other factor analyzed, including residential location”).  See 
generally Demetra Smith Nightingale, Transportation Issues in Welfare Reform: Background 
Information, URBAN INST., Dec. 17, 1997, available at http://www.urban.org/publications/ 
410369.html (describing the role of transportation in welfare reform). 
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becomes critical.48  Finally, poor parents often opt for family child care 
because it is frequently less expensive than center-based care.49 
The reliance on family child care by low-income parents raises two 
interrelated concerns: the quality of care and the economic status of FCC 
providers.  As the following discussion highlights, the dismal quality of 
care has prompted calls for greater regulation of family child care and 
improved training of FCC providers.  This desire is understandable given 
that poor child care quality negatively affects the well-being of children 
receiving such care.50  Yet the focus is unduly myopic, as it fails to 
consider the status of the workers and the strong nexus that exists 
between improved working conditions and improved quality of care. 
Studies indicate that, on average, the quality of family child care is 
“mediocre.”51  For example, one study that evaluated FCC providers 
concluded that thirty-five percent offered inadequate care, while only 
nine percent provided good quality care, and fifty-six percent provided 
adequate care.52  These findings are not surprising since FCC providers, 
as a group, possess limited experience, training, and formal education in 
the child care field.53  While the correlation between these human capital 
variables and outcomes for children in child care has fostered some 
debate,54 ample evidence indicates that children fare better when child 
care workers possess adequate training and/or education.  Specifically, 
research shows that providers with relevant training and education 
engage in more positive interactions with children, display higher levels 
                                                     
 48. See ILL. FACILITIES FUND, WE NEED MORE DAY CARE CENTERS 4 (2003), available at 
http://www.iff.org/resources/content/3/6/documents/iff_latino_study.pdf (“Some neighborhoods 
have no child care centers at all.  In other communities, centers are difficult to reach by public 
transportation or have long waiting lists.”); see also GILLMAN, supra note 28, at 4 (stating that “in 
many low-income neighborhoods family child care is the only type of child care available”). 
 49. See HAMM & JONES-DEWEEVER, supra note 4, at 1 (“New need for child care, especially 
among low-income families, has resulted in an increased reliance on family child care out of both 
maternal preference and monetary necessity.”). 
 50. See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between poor 
child care quality and the well-being of the children in such care). 
 51. See Suzanne W. Helburn & Carollee Howes, Child Care Cost and Quality, 6 FUTURE OF 
CHILD. 62, 68 (1996) (observing that overall family child care is “mediocre”); Suzanne W. Helburn 
et al., Family Child Care Finances and Their Effect on Quality and Incentives, 17 EARLY 
CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 512, 514 (2002) (noting that “[s]tudies of quality of services indicate mediocre 
to poor quality services in the majority of family child care homes”). 
 52. Helburn & Howes, supra note 51, at 68. 
 53. Id. at 69. 
 54. See, e.g., HAMM & JONES-DEWEEVER, supra note 4, at 2 (observing that “[m]easures of 
quality are not without controversy”); James Elicker et al., The Context of Infant Attachment in 
Family Child Care, 20 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 319, 323 (1999) (“Existing evidence 
on the impact of child care provider experience is equivocal.  Some studies have found years of 
experience to be linked to more positive caregiving, whereas others have not.”). 
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of sensitivity toward them, and are more aware of safety and health 
issues, relative to providers who lack such training and education.55  
Research also reveals a link between job turnover among child care 
providers and child care quality.  Children in stable child care situations 
“have more secure attachments, higher complexity of play, more 
advanced language development, and better school achievement.”56  
These positive outcomes, however, often fall by the wayside given that 
fifty-nine percent of FCC providers experience job turnover each year.57 
Although poor quality plagues the child care field generally,58 the 
family child care problem is magnified because it often occurs informally 
and frequently escapes government oversight.  No uniform regulatory 
framework applies to the child care industry, although all states impose 
some level of oversight to help protect children in child care settings.59  
At a minimum, states require licensed providers to satisfy criminal 
background checks, pass a facilities inspection, submit to periodic 
compliance inspections, and meet training criteria.60  However, whereas 
most child care centers must satisfy licensing requirements, significant 
variations exist in family child care.61 
FCC providers loosely fall into three groups, depending on the level 
of government oversight: licensed, certified, and nonregulated.  Licensed 
                                                     
 55. See Judith Bordin et al., The Relation of Quality Indicators to Provider Knowledge of Child 
Development in Family Child Care Homes, 29 CHILD & YOUTH CARE F. 323, 336 (2000) (stating 
that “training . . . may be a powerful way to promote responsive and developmentally appropriate 
care”); Sara Gable & Amy Halliburton, Barriers to Child Care Providers’ Professional 
Development, 32 CHILD & YOUTH CARE F. 175, 175–76 (2003) (discussing the “positive 
relationship between child care provider educational preparation and the quality of children’s 
experiences”); H. Abigail Raikes et al., Regulation, Subsidy Receipt and Provider Characteristics: 
What Predicts Quality in Child Care Homes?, 20 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 164, 165 (2005) 
(stating that “child care quality . . . is affected by provider characteristics, such as the amount of 
training and education the provider has received”). 
 56. Christine M. Todd & Deanna M. Deery-Schmitt, Factors Affecting Turnover Among Family 
Child Care Providers: A Longitudinal Study, 11 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 351, 351–52 (1996). 
 57. Id. at 352. 
 58. HELBURN & BERGMANN, supra note 12, at 5–6. 
 59. Id. at 126. 
 60. CHILD CARE: STATE EFFORTS, supra note 23, at 6. 
 61. See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 44, at 69 (noting that while regulatory requirements vary 
for center-based care, “[t]he greatest variation in regulation is for small family child care homes, 
which fall under the overall regulatory system in only some of the states”); TONI PORTER & 
SHANNON M. KEARNS, SUPPORTING FAMILY, FRIEND AND NEIGHBOR CAREGIVERS: FINDINGS FROM 
A SURVEY OF STATE POLICIES 26 (2005), available at http://www.bankstreet.edu/gems/ICCC/ 
surveypaperfinal.pdf (“One of the most striking findings from our survey relates to the distinctions 
states create between home-based care that is subject to licensing and care that is exempt from these 
regulations.  The variation is wide.  Some states require anyone who cares for even one unrelated 
child to become a regulated family child care provider, while other states do not set a limit on the 
number of children in care if they are all from the same family.”). 
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FCC providers are typically subject to a level of oversight comparable to 
that which governs child care centers.  As a threshold matter, they must 
satisfy criminal background checks, home inspections, and training 
requirements.62  The oversight of certified FCC providers, also referred 
to as registered FCC providers,63 is less rigorous than that which applies 
to licensed providers,64 and usually involves self-certification on the part 
of each individual provider that she meets basic health and safety 
regulations.65  Finally, the third group, nonregulated FCC providers, 
consists of providers who, because they serve a small number of 
children, are not legally required to comply with health and safety 
regulations.66  Of course, in addition to these three groups, there exists a 
sizeable portion of FCC providers who, while legally subject to 
regulation, avoid the regulatory system and work as part of an 
underground economy.67 
                                                     
 62. CHILD CARE: STATE EFFORTS, supra note 23, at 6. 
 63. Id. at 11. 
 64. Id. at 7. 
 65. Id. 
 66. In determining which FCC providers to exempt from regulations, states typically set a 
regulatory threshold “at which regulation begins according to the number of children served by 
different types of providers and exempt from regulation those providers falling below these 
thresholds.”  Id. at 11.  For example, providers in Illinois who care for three or fewer children are 
exempt, while in Missouri, the exemption kicks in if the provider cares for four or fewer children.  
DAN LESSER ET AL., SUPPORTING ALL OUR CHILDREN: CONFERENCE REPORT ON LICENSE-EXEMPT 
HOME CHILD CARE IN ILLINOIS 8 (2002), available at http://www.nclej.org/contents/childcare/ 
SupportingAllChildren.pdf. 
Care provided by a relative or family friend, known as “kith and kin care,” is frequently lumped 
into this category.  See Ann Collins & Barbara Carlson, Child Care by Kith and Kin—Supporting 
Family, Friends, and Neighbors Caring for Children (Nat’l Ctr. for Children in Poverty, Children 
and Welfare Reform Issue Brief 5, 1998), available at http://www.nccp.org/media/cwr98e-text.pdf 
(“Kith and kin child care is frequently, but imprecisely, referred to as ‘informal care,’ a term used to 
identify several types of care situations for which licensing is not required—from family child care 
providers who take care of fewer children than the minimum required for state licensing or 
registration, to nannies or au pairs, to grandmothers, to teenage baby-sitters, to cooperative 
arrangements between parents.”). 
It should be noted that, pursuant to federal law, even providers who would otherwise escape 
state regulations must comply with minimal regulatory standards in order to care for children 
receiving subsidized care.  See COLLINS ET AL., supra note 44, at 76 (“At a minimum, the federal 
CCDF law requires all otherwise unregulated providers who receive subsidies to sign a self-
certification that they will comply with minimum health and safety requirements.”); PORTER & 
KEARNS, supra note 61, at 7 (noting that “Federal CCDF regulations delineate some minimum 
standards that states must apply to all providers who care for subsidized children”). 
 67. See HAMM & JONES-DEWEEVER, supra note 4, at 1–2 (commenting that “[w]hile the exact 
number of unregulated family child care providers is unknown, it is estimated that unregulated 
providers outnumber regulated providers”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 154 
(suggesting reasons why providers may avoid regulation); ZINSSER, supra note 10, at 2 (observing 
that many FCC providers “operate outside the regulatory system—because they either are exempt 
from regulations or choose not to become regulated”). 
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III. THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF FAMILY CHILD CARE PROVIDERS 
The patchwork regulatory framework that governs family child care, 
combined with the increased use of such care, has fostered proposals for 
heightened government oversight of FCC providers and increased public 
funding to promote their professional development.  While these 
proposals, and resulting programs, will presumably improve the quality 
of care, their value to providers is less clear.  Importantly, “providers 
have very little economic incentive to invest in training and quality 
improvement,”68 given that those who do provide quality care realize 
only small monetary gains for their work.69  Even as federal, state, and 
local governments have become more involved in all forms of child care, 
such involvement rarely bodes well for child care workers.  To convey 
this troubling dynamic, the next Subpart surveys the economic status of 
child care workers, with a special emphasis on FCC providers, and 
examines the treatment of providers in publicly funded child care subsidy 
programs. 
A. Caring for Pennies 
Similar to the child care workforce in general, the overwhelming 
majority—ninety-eight percent—of all FCC providers are women.70  As 
a group, they are disproportionately poor women.  In fact, the child care 
industry has more workers whose earnings fall below the poverty line 
than any other industry, and more than fifty percent of all providers earn 
poverty-level incomes.71  While exact wages are difficult to compute for 
                                                     
 68. Helburn et al., supra note 51, at 534; see also GORMLEY, supra note 10, at 59 (commenting 
that “training carries with it meager financial rewards”); HAMM & JONES-DEWEEVER, supra note 4, 
at 3 (“There are very few financial incentives in the child care market for improving child care.  In 
general, family child care providers do not see an increase in income when they improve the quality 
of care or attend training.”). 
 69. See GORMLEY, supra note 10, at 59 (commenting that few financial incentives come from 
training); Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Care, Inequality, and Policy, in CHILD CARE AND 
INEQUALITY: RETHINKING CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 133, 133, 136 (Francesca M. 
Cancian et al. eds., 2002) (finding that caregiving often results in a wage penalty for workers 
involved in care work). 
 70. TUOMINEN, supra note 10, at 5. 
 71. Id. at 9.  The following sources provide a glimpse into the annual earnings received by FCC 
providers.  CHILDCARE WORKGROUP, INSURE THE UNINSURED PROJECT, OPTIONS TO INCREASE 
HEALTH COVERAGE OF THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE 2 (2002), available at http://www.itup.org/ 
Workgroups/ChildCare/ChildCarereportAug2002.pdf (reporting that “37% of [uninsured] family 
home providers [in California] had incomes of $20,000 or less” and that “50% of uninsured family 
home providers had incomes in excess of $30,000 annually”; also noting that net incomes of family 
day care providers were significantly less because of expenses such as “food, toys, play materials, 
facility wear and tear, insurance, regulatory compliance and reporting, and accounting/bookkeeping 
 
SMITH FINAL.DOC 3/5/2007  3:06:24 PM 
334 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
 
 
providers, the available evidence confirms that their hourly earnings are 
extremely low and substantially less than workers employed as pet 
sitters, fast-food servers, and gas-station attendants.72  Moreover, most 
FCC providers earn low wages despite toiling exceedingly long hours, 
working an average of sixty hours per week.73  Along with low wages 
and long hours, family child care is characterized by few job-related 
benefits.  Rarely do FCC providers receive benefits such as health 
insurance, vacation time, or retirement plans.74 
Child care work is heavily mediated, not only by gender and class, 
but also by race.  Racial-ethnic women are far more likely than white 
women to work in child care.  Although they represent only thirteen 
percent of all paid workers in the labor force, racial-ethnic women 
account for a third of all paid child care workers.75  Indeed, “the 
representation of women of color is more than 250 percent higher in the 
                                                                                                                       
assistance”); CTR. FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, A PROFILE OF THE SAN MATEO COUNTY 
CHILD CARE WORKFORCE 11 (2002), available at http://www.thecouncil.net/pdf_files/ 
2002ChildWorkforce.pdf (reporting that the annual net income for a typical FCC provider in San 
Mateo County, California—who “has been in operation for ten years, works 61 hours per week, and 
cares for seven children”—is only $21,955); RESOURCES FOR CHILD CARING ET AL., MEASURING 
UP: THE QUALITY OF CHILD CARE IN MINNESOTA 1, available at  http://education.umn.edu/ceed/ 
publications/briefsandreports/measuringup/mu15page.pdf (reporting that “[t]he majority of family 
child care providers [in Minnesota] earned a net income of less than $10,000”); VT. CHILD CARE 
SERVS. DIV., VERMONT CHILD CARE WAGES, BENEFITS AND CREDENTIALS 2 (2002), available at 
http://www.state.vt.us/srs/childcare/research/WagesBenefitsCred.pdf (noting that in Vermont, 
“[f]orty-two percent of family child care providers have a net income of less than $10,000 per year 
from their work”); Mike Comerford & Nushin Huq, Home Child-care Workers Vote 
Overwhelmingly to Unionize, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Apr. 27, 2005, at 1 (reporting a recent study by 
the Illinois Department of Human Resources which indicated that approximately fifty-eight percent 
of all FCC providers in the state earn an annual income of less than $11,000 per year). 
 72. CTR. FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, CURRENT DATA ON CHILD CARE SALARIES AND 
BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2002), available at http://ccw.cleverspin.com/pubs/ 
2002Compendium.pdf; see also TUOMINEN, supra note 10, at 9 (observing that “[i]n 1998 service 
station attendants and food servers were among those workers making higher wages than child care 
providers . . . even though the work week of family child care providers is 30 percent longer than 
that of these other occupations”). 
 73. Helburn et al., supra note 51, at 521; see also NANCY L. MARSHALL ET AL., 
MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY CHILD CARE TODAY: A REPORT OF THE FINDINGS FROM THE 
MASSACHUSETTS COST AND QUALITY STUDY 6 (2003), available at http://www.wcwonline.org/ 
earlycare/FamilyChildCare2004.pdf (observing that “[p]roviders spent an average of 52 hours a 
week directly caring for children, plus an additional 10 hours a week, on average, on tasks related to 
their family child care business (such as doing laundry, food shopping, and record-keeping)”). 
 74. CTR. FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, supra note 72, at 3; see also MARCY WHITEBOOK 
ET AL., CTR. FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, WORTHY WORK, UNLIVABLE WAGES: THE 
NATIONAL CHILD CARE STAFFING STUDY, 1988–1997, at 20 (1998), available at http:// 
ccw.cleverspin.com/pubs/worthywork.pdf (observing that while there have been improvements in 
the provision of health benefits to child care workers, “coverage . . . remains woefully inadequate, 
particularly given teachers’ daily exposure to illness”). 
 75. TUOMINEN, supra note 10, at 6. 
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child care work force than it is in the work force at large.”76  In addition, 
a race-gender hierarchy exists within the child care industry that 
relegates racial-ethnic women to the poorest paying child care jobs, such 
as family child care.77 
B. Devaluing Child Care: The Problem of Low Reimbursement Rates 
These days, the low earnings that prevail in family child care must be 
understood in the context of child care subsidy policies implemented to 
further welfare reform goals.  Such policies have helped to perpetuate the 
low-wage child care market.  In order for welfare reform to succeed, 
poor working parents must have access to affordable child care.  As part 
of its goal to bolster the provision of child care, Congress consolidated 
key sources of federal funding for child care subsidies into one block 
grant, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF).78  The CCDF 
provides federal funds to the states to develop child care programs 
targeted toward low-income working families.79  Under the CCDF, states 
must provide eligible families a choice among differing child care 
options,80 such as center-based care, group home care, family child care, 
and in-home care.81 
                                                     
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 10; see also England & Folbre, supra note 69, at 133 (observing that “[c]aregivers are 
disproportionately female.  Further, women of color are overrepresented in many of the most poorly 
paid caring jobs, such as child care, elder care, and health care performed within clients’ homes”). 
 78. 45 C.F.R. § 98.1(b)(1) (2005). 
 79. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD CARE: STATES INCREASED SPENDING ON LOW-
INCOME FAMILIES 7 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01293.pdf; Sandra L. 
Hofferth, Child Care, Maternal Employment, and Public Policy, 563 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 20, 28 (1999). 
 80. 45 C.F.R. § 98.30(e)(1) (2005); see also COLLINS ET AL., supra note 44, at 75 (stating that 
“[o]ne of the major principles of the Child Care and Development Fund is to provide families that 
receive subsidies a choice of all legally-available forms of child care”). 
 81. The CCDF also provides that parents must be given the option of using kith and kin care.  
See supra note 66 (describing kith and kin care, and noting that even as such care would otherwise 
escape state regulations, if kith and kin providers care for children receiving subsidized care, they 
must comply with minimal regulatory standards pursuant to federal law). 
For a description of the various child care categories, see CHILD CARE: STATE EFFORTS, supra 
note 23, at 6, which provides the following definitions of care providers: child care centers are 
“[n]onresidential facilities that provide care for children and include full- and part-time group 
programs, such as nursery and preschool programs.  Child care centers can be commercial, work-site 
based, school-based (preschool or after school), or a recreational program (such as camps or parks), 
and care can also be run by a religious organizations [sic] or by federal, state, or local governments”; 
group home care means “[t]wo or more providers who provide child care services in a private 
residence other than the child’s home (this does not include 24-hour residential facilities)”; in-home 
care is “[c]are provided in the child’s home”; family child care refers to “[a]n individual provider 
who provides child care services as the sole caregiver in a private residence other than the child’s 
home.” 
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States generally make subsidized funding for child care available to 
individual families in the form of a child care voucher or certificate 
which families can use to purchase care from among the available child 
care options.  States reimburse providers based on the voucher or 
certificate once the providers submit an invoice.82  Reimbursement rates 
vary according to the type of provider and are generally set by the 
government without provider input.83  As a result of this process, FCC 
providers are usually compensated at rates that do not provide decent 
wages. 
States establish provider reimbursement rates relative to the “market 
rate” for child care within a geographical area.84  This approach raises 
various red flags, including a concern that the market rate reflects 
harmful gender-based assumptions about the value of work performed 
primarily by women.  Although labor market dynamics are portrayed as a 
fair basis for establishing wages,85 various commentators argue that 
discrimination against women has tainted the market’s wage-setting 
process.86  This argument has particular relevance to child care because 
                                                     
 82. RACHEL SCHUMACHER ET AL., CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, UNTAPPED POTENTIAL?  
HOW STATES CONTRACT DIRECTLY WITH PROVIDERS TO SHORE UP CHILD CARE CHOICES FOR 
LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 41 (2003), available at http://www.buildinitiative.org/docs/untapped_ 
rpt.pdf. 
 83. U.S. ASS’N FOR CHILD CARE, CONDUCTING MARKET RATE SURVEYS: HOW DOES YOUR 
STATE RATE? 12 (2000), available at http://www.usachildcare.org/programs/kidsrate/ 
market_rate_report.pdf.  As an alternative to vouchers, some child care centers provide child care 
through contracts.  In the world of child care subsidies, contracts refer to “legal agreement[s] made 
between a state and a child care provider prior to service delivery that the provider will make 
available a certain number of child care slots, which will be paid for by the state so long as 
contracted state program or attendance conditions are met.”  SCHUMACHER ET AL., supra note 82, at 
7.  Importantly, “[c]ontract providers may negotiate for rates.”  Id. at 63. 
 84. See 45 C.F.R. § 98.43(b)(2) (2005) (requiring states to conduct market rate surveys and to 
use survey results to determine adequate payment rates); HEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 4 (discussing 
how states set reimbursement rates). 
 85. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1311, 1330–31 (1989) (outlining three qualifications for a competitive labor market to achieve 
comparable worth); see also Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable 
Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1757–59 (1986) (describing how the intrinsic value and ranking of 
jobs “could serve as the standard for fixing a fair rate of compensation for work traditionally 
performed by women”). 
 86. See Ruth Gerber Blumrosen, Remedies for Wage Discrimination, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
99, 151 (1986) (noting that “[b]ecause the market rate for women’s and minorities’ jobs is likely to 
incorporate discriminatory wage-setting practices of all the employers who make up that market, 
employers should not be able simply to rely on ‘the market’”); see also Nancy Gertner, Thoughts on 
Comparable Worth Litigation and Organizational Strategies, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 163, 166 
(1986) (discussing how an allegedly neutral market devalues women’s work and reflects 
discrimination); Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1207, 1217–20 (1988) 
(observing that “[i]n theory, a well-functioning free market should serve to erode . . . discriminatory 
patterns,” but “[e]ven reasonably competitive markets will permit . . . discrimination premised on 
generalizations that are inaccurate in a large percentage of cases, but are cheaper to indulge than to 
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of the work’s close association with women’s unpaid work in the home.  
Even though paid child care is compensated labor, it suffers from a 
perception that caring for children, while socially important, is unskilled, 
emotional work of only marginal economic value.87  Family child care 
exacerbates this perception because, similar to domestic labor in the 
home, “it remains located within families, a site that historically 
promotes the invisibility of women and their care work.”88  Research 
confirms that gender stereotypes have contaminated the market for child 
care such that child care workers experience a wage penalty.89 
Use of the market rate as a reference point to establish provider 
reimbursement rates is also problematic because, in many low-income 
communities, the “government is often the primary or sole purchaser” of 
child care.90  Government agencies typically cap their rates at “a 
predetermined ceiling” that does not reflect the actual costs of child 
care.91  Because of limited market competition in communities that rely 
heavily on subsidized child care, the market rate for child care becomes 
artificially low and is noticeably lower than rates charged by providers 
who do not care for subsidized children.92 
PRWORA’s failure to require states to set reimbursement rates at a 
minimum level relative to market rates further compounds this difficulty.  
Under AFDC, states had to set provider payment rates at the seventy-
fifth percentile of market rates.93  The seventy-fifth percentile rate is the 
rate at or below which at least seventy-five percent of providers in a 
category charge their clients.94  The AFDC requirement assured 
                                                                                                                       
ignore”). 
 87. See, e.g., TUOMINEN, supra note 10, at 42–46 (discussing the rationale behind the 
devaluation of child care); Paula England et al., Wages of Virtue: The Relative Pay of Care Work, 49 
SOC. PROBS. 455, 457 (2002) (discussing the pay penalty of care work and its association with 
women and mothering); Deborah Rutman, Child Care as Women’s Work: Workers’ Experiences of 
Powerfulness and Powerlessness, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 629, 630 (1996) (discussing how child care 
has been perceived as emotional work of little value). 
 88. TUOMINEN, supra note 10, at 23. 
 89. See England et al., supra note 87, at 464 (finding that “working in a caring occupation leads 
to a significant net wage penalty . . . for both men and women”); see also TUOMINEN, supra note 10, 
at 46 (stating that “studies demonstrate that jobs requiring greater nurturance and caring skills are 
penalized when it comes to wages”); England & Folbre, supra note 69, at 137 (discussing studies 
showing the net effect on pay of working in a job involving caring labor compared to other kinds of 
work). 
 90. U.S. ASS’N FOR CHILD CARE, supra note 83, at 5. 
 91. Id.; see also COLLINS ET AL., supra note 44, at 82 (noting that an additional concern with 
market rates for child care is that “the price of care [is] lower than the true cost of quality care and, 
by surveying price, rather than cost, the state . . . undermin[es] ‘quality’”). 
 92. U.S. ASS’N FOR CHILD CARE, supra note 83, at 5. 
 93. 45 C.F.R. § 255.4(a)(2)(iii) (1995), removed by 62 Fed. Reg. 64,301, 64,303 (Dec. 5, 1997); 
HEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 4 n.4. 
 94. U.S. ASS’N FOR CHILD CARE, supra note 83, at 4 (citation omitted). 
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providers that they would be reimbursed at a rate that was at least 
equivalent to the rate charged by seventy-five percent of providers in the 
market.  However, while PRWORA encourages states to set their 
reimbursement rates at least equal to the seventy-fifth percentile of 
market rates, states are not obligated to do so.95  While some states do 
reimburse providers at or above this level, many do not.96 
Low reimbursement rates hold troubling implications for all child 
care providers and pose particular challenges to FCC providers and the 
communities that they serve.  States generally pay lower rates to FCC 
providers than they pay to centers that provide similar care.  For 
example, in some cities in Oregon, FCC providers receive $2.39 per hour 
to care for infants, while child care centers receive $3.29 per hour to 
provide the same care.97  Likewise, in Illinois, FCC providers receive 
$21.53 per day for children under two-and-a-half years of age, while 
child care centers receive $33.77 per day for children under the age of 
two-and-a-half.98  As researcher Mary Tuominen comments, “[o]n the 
public-private continuum, women’s care work that is most removed from 
the public sphere seems to have the least public value and receives the 
least economic reward.”99 
State reimbursement systems also perpetuate existing class- and 
race-based disparities among FCC providers.  Because racial-ethnic 
providers are more likely to care for subsidized children than white 
                                                     
 95. See Child Care and Development Fund, 63 Fed. Reg. 39,936, 39,959 (July 24, 1998) (“In 
establishing payment rates we suggest a benchmark for States to consider.  Payments established at 
least at the 75th percentile of the market would be regarded as providing equal access.”); see also 
HEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 4 (noting that “[a]lthough current federal child care regulations 
require states to complete market rate surveys every two years, the regulations do not set a minimum 
level for provider payment rates”). 
 96. See, e.g., Child Care Helps Families Work and Children Learn: Hearing on Child Care and 
Development Block Grant Before the Subcomm. on 21st Century Competitiveness of the H. Comm. 
on Education and the Workforce, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Helen Blank, Director of Child 
Care and Development, Children’s Defense Fund) (stating that “[n]early half of the states . . . set 
their [provider reimbursement] rates below the 75th percentile of the market rate—the rate that gives 
families access to 75 percent of their community’s providers—or base them on outdated market rate 
surveys”); HEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 4 (reporting that “only 18 states paid providers at or above 
the 75th percentile”); U.S. ASS’N FOR CHILD CARE, supra note 83, at 4 (observing that “[s]ome 
states pay above the 75th percentile while others reimburse providers at rates well below the 75th 
percentile”); Susan Traub, Note, Child Care & PRWORA: Paying the Babysitter or Investing in 
Early Education?, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 262 n.89 (2002) (commenting that “only 
three states, Florida, Maine, and Oklahoma, pay above market rates in certain circumstances”). 
 97. OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., CHILD CARE SUBSIDY RATES, http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ 
children/childcare/ccrate1.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2006). 
 98. STATE OF ILL. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., CHILD CARE PAYMENT RATES (2000), available 
at http://www.dhs.state.il.us/chp/ofh/MIH/pdf/rates2000cc.pdf. 
 99. TUOMINEN, supra note 10, at 177. 
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providers,100 a greater percentage of their earnings comes from the 
government.  Few providers who live in middle- or upper-class 
communities will accept children receiving state subsidies because they 
can earn more money than the state will pay them.101  By contrast, 
providers in low-income communities, constrained by their own 
economic circumstances as well as those of their potential clientele, 
cannot afford to refuse to provide state-subsidized care.102  Because the 
government ties reimbursement rates to specific geographical areas, it 
pays less for child care in low-income communities relative to the rates 
charged by providers in more affluent neighborhoods103 and, in the 
process, reinforces racial-ethnic and class inequalities between 
communities.104 
It is against the foregoing backdrop that one must appreciate the 
struggle of FCC providers to secure collective bargaining rights and 
resist exploitation at the hands of state government agencies responsible 
for administering child care subsidy programs.105  Although some 
commentators question the wisdom of unionizing child care,106 “unions 
                                                     
 100. Id. at 134. 
 101. See id. at 136–40 (providing real life examples of such providers). 
 102. See id. at 141–47 (providing real life examples of such providers). 
 103. Id. at 137. 
 104. Id. at 129.  The treatment of FCC providers who deliver subsidized care epitomizes the 
government’s abdication of its responsibility and its willingness to exploit workers who already exist 
on the economic margins of society.  Having committed to welfare reform and having recognized 
that child care is critical to effectuate welfare reform’s goals, states have effectively passed a 
considerable portion of the costs of reform on to FCC providers in the form of substandard 
compensation.  Moreover, states have arguably turned to family child care in part because of the 
job’s poor wages.  Absent adequate public funding for child care, states have seized upon family 
child care as a low-cost approach to help provide child care to welfare-to-work recipients.  Arguably, 
state policymakers view family child care as a potential solution to the problem of insufficient child 
care in poor communities precisely because women in those communities have long provided such 
care for little pay and no benefits. 
 105. As noted earlier, unions have targeted those FCC providers who care for children receiving 
publicly funded child care.  Consequently, unionization is not a viable option for the many FCC 
providers who operate as part of an underground market and who look to avoid regulation at all 
costs.  It is also safe to assume that such providers would have little, if any, interest in unionization.  
See, e.g., GORMLEY, supra note 10, at 60 (observing that “many providers view government 
regulation with skepticism, fear, or outright hostility”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, 
at 154 (listing reasons providers remain unregulated).  Even among providers who do deliver 
publicly subsidized child care, attitudes towards unionization may be mixed.  For example, providers 
who have very little commitment to the job and view themselves as only temporary workers will 
likely have limited interest in unionization.  See, e.g., MICHEL, supra note 16, at 262 (observing that 
some FCC providers see themselves as temporary workers).  In addition, providers may be opposed 
to unionization to the extent that it represents greater oversight or involvement from the government. 
 106. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 182 (observing that “many early 
childhood experts express concerns about the effects of unions on the nature of the intimate 
relationships between staff, parents, and children in child care”); see also JIM MORIN, TAKING 
MATTERS INTO OUR OWN HANDS: A GUIDE TO UNIONIZING IN THE CHILD CARE FIELD 15 (1991) 
 
SMITH FINAL.DOC 3/5/2007  3:06:24 PM 
340 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
 
 
can play an instrumental role both in alleviating the vulnerability of 
workers and in linking child care quality with improved working 
conditions.”107  Importantly, unions have demonstrated an ability and a 
willingness to pursue a comprehensive approach to the problem of 
inadequate child care funding, an approach that recognizes that the 
problem is not only a matter of child care affordability and availability 
for consumers, but also a labor issue for child care workers.108 
IV. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO ORGANIZING AND REPRESENTING 
FAMILY CHILD CARE PROVIDERS 
While unions can assist FCC providers in negotiating with the state 
to gain improved working conditions and higher wages, organizing this 
group of workers presents numerous practical and legal obstacles.  This 
Part considers the practical challenges of organizing and bargaining for 
FCC providers.  Parts V and VI then explore in depth the primary legal 
hurdle that must be addressed: the exclusion of FCC providers from 
collective bargaining statutes. 
As with many low-wage service jobs, family child care clashes with 
the model of work site unionism that undergirds the collective bargaining 
process in this country.  Developed and perfected against the landscape 
of manufacturing jobs, work site unionism functions best when applied 
to a group of workers who labor for a common employer and at a 
common workplace that has a fixed location.  In such an environment, 
labor organizers can easily identify both the employer as well as the 
potential bargaining unit.  As I observed in the context of private-paid 
household workers, this type of identification is extremely difficult in 
occupations where workers are both hidden inside the private sphere of 
the home and work in isolation from each other without a common 
workplace.109  The one-on-one character of the family child care 
relationship—where an individual provider interacts with several parents, 
but does so separately with each one—stands in sharp opposition to the 
vision of collective bargaining. 
The personal quality of family child care further complicates the 
organization of FCC providers.  Contrary to the typical manufacturing 
                                                                                                                       
(noting that a challenge to organizing is that “[c]hild care teachers often do not perceive themselves 
as the ‘type’ who join unions”). 
 107. Smith, supra note 5, at 421. 
 108. Id. at 431. 
 109. Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and 
Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 45, 70–71 (2000). 
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job, many service jobs, family child care included, involve personal 
service “with workers interacting directly with clients, patients, or 
customers.  The presence of these third parties complicates the 
conventional ‘us-them’ view of workplace relations.”110  In family child 
care, providers often develop strong emotional and personal bonds with 
the children for whom they care.  When providers describe what they 
most enjoy about their work, they commonly reference the emotional 
connections that they have with their young charges and frequently 
describe their work as an act of “mothering.”111  This type of emotional 
attachment does not mesh readily with a model of unionism that 
embraces confrontation and opposition.112 
Strategies for union representation of the child care workforce must 
also allow for the fact that many families are simply unable to pay child 
care workers decent wages.  In light of this reality, child care 
unionization may have difficulty garnering public support if the 
bargaining process undermines parents’ ability to afford child care or 
sacrifices the interests of children receiving such care.  This observation 
is especially relevant to family child care because it caters 
disproportionately to the working poor.  Thus, contrary to most 
successful union negotiations, where consumers typically shoulder the 
costs of improved labor conditions in the form of higher prices, it is 
unreasonable to expect parents, as child care consumers, to bear the costs 
associated with enhanced wages or benefits for FCC providers.  If labor 
is to help FCC providers secure improved wages and working conditions, 
it must push for increased public support and funding for child care.113 
                                                     
 110. Id. at 69. 
 111. TUOMINEN, supra note 10, at 50–51; JULIA WRIGLEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S CHILDREN: AN 
INTIMATE ACCOUNT OF THE DILEMMAS FACING MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS AND THE WOMEN THEY 
HIRE TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN 86 (1995). 
 112. On this point, it is worth noting that anecdotal evidence suggests that segments of the child 
care workforce may be reluctant to participate in highly confrontational tactics.  See, e.g., DAN 
BELLM, NEW APPROACHES TO ORGANIZING IN THE CHILD CARE INDUSTRY 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.laborproject.org/publications/pdf/bellm.pdf (“Wariness and anti-union sentiments are 
common within this workforce, although there are signs of growing openness.  Typical concerns 
include: Will unions go against my concern for the children and my relationships with families?”). 
 113. See WHITEBOOK, supra note 5, at 16 (“‘To meet the needs of child care staff for a decent 
income and of parents for affordable services, either government or industry will have to bear its 
share of the cost.  Obtaining increased financial support will require changing the prevailing view 
that child care is unskilled work and enhancing public appreciation of it.’” (quoting Marcy 
Whitebook et al., Who’s Minding the Child Care Workers? A Look at Staff Burn-out, CHILDREN 
TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 1981, at 2, 2–6)); see also ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT 66–68 (2004) (discussing 
the public goods argument for child care); NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART 5–6 (2001) 
(outlining arguments for treating child care as a public good); HELBURN & BERGMANN, supra note 
12, at 5–6 (same). 
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Although formidable, these obstacles are not insurmountable.  To 
respond effectively to them, labor must rethink conventional models of 
organizing and develop alternative approaches that can respond to the 
specific challenges of home-based, low-wage care work.  Labor has 
achieved gains on this front that can prove useful to organizing FCC 
providers.  The successful unionization of home care workers is 
particularly instructive. 
Home care workers enable elderly and disabled individuals to live 
independently by helping them perform a range of household activities 
such as cleaning, meal preparation, and assisting with personal hygiene 
tasks.114  In the 1980s, the labor movement initiated a campaign to 
organize the California home care workforce.115  The campaign, which 
spanned twelve years, confronted many of the aforementioned challenges 
that face FCC providers, in particular, worker fragmentation, potential 
divisiveness between consumers and workers, and limited consumer 
resources.116 
Similar to family child care, home care work occurs within the 
private sphere of the home, although the homes at issue belong to the 
care recipients and not to the workers.117  Lacking a common work site, 
the home care workforce is highly fragmented, and workers rarely have 
occasion to come together as a group.118  Consequently, union organizers 
turned to a labor-intensive, door-to-door grassroots organizing approach 
in order to find and mobilize the workers.119  Organizers “‘went to senior 
citizens’ centers, doctor’s offices, markets, churches . . . [and] even dug 
in trash cans to find lists of workers.’”120  A comparable grassroots 
                                                     
 114. Delp & Quan, supra note 9, at 3. 
 115. See Stu Schneider, Victories for Home Health Care Workers, DOLLARS & SENSE, Sept.–
Oct. 2003, at 25, 25 (noting that the SEIU first attempted to organize California-based home care 
workers, who worked for the state, in the 1980s); see also Immanuel Ness, Organizing Home 
Health-Care Workers: A New York City Case Study, 3 WORKINGUSA 59, 71–80 (1999) (discussing 
the campaign to organize home care workers in New York). 
 116. See Ness, supra note 115, at 82 (detailing the importance of mobilizing an atomized work 
force, clients, and state and municipal governments). 
 117. Another relevant similarity between home and family child care is the composition of the 
workforce.  Like FCC providers, home care workers are overwhelmingly female and 
disproportionately women of color.  See Delp & Quan, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that home care 
workers are primarily women and persons of color); Ness, supra note 115, at 69 (“[T]he industry 
predominantly consists of middle-aged minority women.  . . .”). 
 118. Delp & Quan, supra note 9, at 4; see also HEINRITZ-CANTERBURY, supra note 9, at 11 
(“Recruiting union members in home care differs from most other industries, because home care 
provides no common work site—no shop floor where employees work together.”). 
 119. See Delp & Quan, supra note 9, at 6–8 (detailing the activities of the union’s grassroots 
organizing approach). 
 120. Id. at 6 (quoting interview by Linda Delp with Verdia Daniels, President, SEIU Local 434-
B, in L.A., Cal. (May 6, 2000)); see also HEINRITZ-CANTERBURY, supra note 9, at 19 n.8 (noting 
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strategy holds promise for reaching out to FCC providers, particularly 
those providers who, while providing subsidized care, are unlicensed.  
Unions should have an easier task locating licensed FCC providers, as 
states routinely keep public referral lists of such providers.121  Also, in 
some areas, providers may gather together as members of state and local 
FCC provider networks or associations.122 
As with family child care, the majority of home care consumers lack 
the financial resources to improve the wages of home care workers.123  
As one commentator observed, home care “[u]nionization meant the 
possibility of wage demands and strikes against elderly and disabled 
consumers.  If the workers became pitted against the consumers, the 
public might well sympathize with the consumers.”124  To minimize the 
likelihood of this outcome, labor formed a strong coalition that 
represented a partnership, first and foremost, between workers and 
consumers, but which also attracted the backing of community 
organizations and advocacy groups.125  The coalition’s success required 
that the group demonstrate to consumers that they shared common 
interests with workers and convince them that unionization was not a 
“‘zero sum’ proposition in which increased wages for workers could only 
come at the expense of fewer hours of care for consumers.”126  Working 
as part of a coalition, labor effectively made the case that the problems 
that had long plagued home care services, including high turnover rates 
and poorly trained workers, could be ameliorated by transforming home 
care work into a decent job.127  The coalition recognized the financial 
constraints on consumers and made it a priority to mobilize public  
 
                                                                                                                       
that organizers contacted home care workers through “house visits, mailings, and other outreach”); 
Ness, supra note 115, at 73 (highlighting tactics to overcome worker “atomization” including 
“public hearings, rank-and-file lobbying, polling, coalition building, rallies, organized press 
campaigns, and soliciting support from prominent leaders and public officials”). 
 121. See INCREASED WORK PARTICIPATION, supra note 38, at 6 (“States and localities maintain 
data about providers that can help parents in choosing a provider . . . .”). 
 122. See, e.g., WHITEBOOK, supra note 5, at 30–31 (discussing Direct Action for Rights of 
Equality, a grassroots family child care association in Rhode Island); Fred Brooks, New Turf for 
Organizing: Family Child Care Providers, 29 LAB. STUD. J. 45, 50 (2005) (suggesting that it may be 
easier to recruit FCC providers than home care workers because many “providers are members of 
informal networks and are well connected to other providers through these associations”); McMillan, 
supra note 28, at 23–24 (discussing family child care networks in New York City). 
 123. See Delp & Quan, supra note 9, at 4–5 (noting that many consumers of home care do not 
have the ability to increase the wages of workers like normal employers do). 
 124. Id. at 5. 
 125. Id. at 11–12; see also Ness, supra note 115, at 64 (noting the importance of “political 
coalitions” and “movements” in gaining political power for workers). 
 126. Delp & Quan, supra note 9, at 12. 
 127. HEINRITZ-CANTERBURY, supra note 9, at 20. 
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support to pressure state and local governments to provide greater 
funding for home care services.128 
As I wrote elsewhere,129 this approach suggests three key lessons for 
the organization of family child care. 
First, in order to improve the wages of child care workers, unions must 
affirmatively push for enhanced public support of child care.  Second, 
such a push needs to emphasize the critical connection between quality 
care and decent working conditions.  Third, unions need to unite a 
broad base coalition around the issue of child care that will clearly 
convey that child care is a matter of public concern.  To this end, 
unions should look to forge partnerships with interested constituencies 
including parents, child care employers, as well as community 
groups.130 
Although resolution of the practical challenges facing family child care’s 
organization is a critical step, labor must also figure out how to represent 
FCC providers even as popular opinion views them as self-employed, 
independent contractors. 
V. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS OR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES? 
Federal antitrust law presents a significant barrier to the 
representation of FCC providers.  The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very 
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” that unreasonably restrains 
competition.131  While labor organizations are exempted from antitrust 
law,132 the exemption extends only to the organization of employees, not 
                                                     
 128. See Delp & Quan, supra note 9, at 11–14 (explaining that consumers already had 
established lobbying groups). 
 129. Peggie R. Smith, Laboring for Child Care: A Consideration of New Approaches to 
Represent Low-Income Service Workers, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 583 (2006). 
 130. Id. at 621; see also WHITEBOOK, supra note 5, at 14 (commenting on the early efforts of 
child care activists and noting that while “[t]raditional workplace organizing was viewed as an 
important tool for improving child care jobs, . . . it was also necessary to pursue a public policy 
strategy to leverage additional public resources beyond parent fees to create the necessary funding 
base for change” and that “[f]rom the onset, [the child care] movement was about more than 
improving the lot of child care workers.  They connected the well-being of children and families 
with their own well-being.  Teacher advocates were explicit about the link between the quality of 
child care jobs and the quality of services.  They wanted more respect and better pay for themselves, 
but they were just as deeply committed to upgrading the care and education”); Brooks, supra note 
122, at 58–59 (noting the importance of linking public issues with union issues in family child care). 
 131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000). 
 132. Section 6 of the Clayton Act immunizes labor organization activities designed to carry out 
the “legitimate” purposes of labor unions from liability under antitrust laws.  Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 
6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000)).  Section 6 of the Clayton Act 
provides: “The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.  Nothing 
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independent contractors.133  Working out of their homes and arranging 
with individual parents to provide child care, FCC providers appear to 
fall squarely under the heading of independent contractors.  Yet some 
providers assert that they are state employees, and as such should possess 
labor rights, including the right to organize and engage in collective 
bargaining.  This assertion underscores the pervasiveness of child care 
regulations in some states as well as the extent to which states, through 
the use of child care subsidies, pay for the services of FCC providers.  
While many providers remain outside the scope of regulation or are 
subject to only minimal oversight, others find that they must comply with 
such a host of regulations that the question arises as to whether they truly 
work in an independent manner.  This Part examines whether FCC 
providers are independent contractors or employees for purposes of 
collective bargaining rights. 
A. A Matter of Control 
Enormously expansive in scope, the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) extends the right to organize and join a union to any 
“employee,”134 with certain specific exceptions.135  Because the Act 
covers only private-sector employment,136 it would not apply to FCC 
providers even if they are classified as state employees.  That said, 
NLRA case law provides precedential value in interpreting state labor 
relation laws that authorize collective bargaining for various public 
employees.137  Of particular significance is case law on the 
                                                                                                                       
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . 
organizations, . . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully 
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof . . . .”  Id. 
 133. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (stating that the “term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . 
any individual having the status of an independent contractor”). 
 134. See, e.g., NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90–92 (1995) (stating that the 
ordinary dictionary definition of “employee” is consistent with the phrasing of the NLRA). 
 135. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (excluding “any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or 
in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his 
parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual 
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor 
Act”). 
 136. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000) (excluding from the definition of “employer” all federal, 
state, and local government entities). 
 137. See, e.g., Benjamin Aaron, Unfair Labor Practices and the Right to Strike in the Public 
Sector: Has the National Labor Relations Act Been a Good Model?, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1097, 1097 
(1986) (noting that NLRB decisions have been used by state courts to interpret state statutes dealing 
with collective bargaining rights for public-sector employees); Rona L. Pietrzak, Some Reflections 
on Mackay’s Application to Legal Economic Strikes in the Public Sector: An Analysis of State 
Collective Bargaining Statutes, 68 OR. L. REV. 87, 127 (1989) (noting that both the Montana and 
Vermont Supreme Courts have turned to federal case law when interpreting state statutes dealing 
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aforementioned exemption of independent contractors from the NLRA’s 
definition of employee.138 
In distinguishing between employees and independent contractors, 
both the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the courts apply 
general agency principles that accord considerable weight to the level of 
control that a company exercises over the “manner and means” by which 
a worker performs her job.139  Using this approach, an employment 
relationship exists if the employer reserves the right to control not only 
the result to be achieved, but also the means to be used to attain the 
result.  By contrast, an independent contractor relationship exists where 
“‘the employer . . . reserve[s] only the right to control the ends to be 
achieved.’”140 
While control is central to the inquiry, assessing whether an 
employment relationship exists depends upon other factors as well.  As 
outlined by the Court in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,141 
those factors include 
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the 
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the 
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion 
over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired 
party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of 
the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in  
 
                                                                                                                       
with labor practices like collective bargaining). 
 138. By way of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Congress made clear that the NLRA excludes “any 
individual having the status of an independent contractor.”  29 U.S.C. § 152(2).  For useful 
commentary on the Act and its legislative history, see David E. Feller, Taft and Hartley Vindicated: 
The Curious History of Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 296, 
298 (1998); Taft-Hartley Symposium: The First Fifty Years, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763 (1998).  See 
also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 279–90 (1974) (discussing the Act’s legislative 
history). 
 139. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (applying general agency 
principles to determine whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor); N. Am. 
Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that “[i]n applying traditional 
agency law principles, the NLRB and the courts have adopted a right-to-control test”); Local 777, 
Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that “[c]ontrol 
exercised over the ‘manner and means of performance,’ . . . is the identifying characteristic of an 
employer/employee relationship”); In re Morton, 30 N.E.2d 369, 371 (N.Y. 1940) (observing that 
the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor turns on the “right of control 
over the [worker] in respect of the manner in which his work is to be done”). 
 140. C.C. E., Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Twin City Freight, Inc., 
221 N.L.R.B. 1219, 1220 (1975)). 
 141. 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992). 
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business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of 
the hired party.142 
The NLRB has utilized the control test to determine whether FCC 
providers qualify as employees in two cases: Rosemount Center & 
Rosemount Center Workers Ass’n143 and Cardinal McCloskey’s 
Children’s & Family Services.144 
1. Rosemount Center 
Rosemount Center involved a nonprofit child care center located in 
the District of Columbia.  In addition to having on staff several child care 
teachers who worked at the Center’s facilities, the Center used the 
services of five “family home mothers” who operated out of their own 
homes, providing home child care as an alternative to center-based 
care.145  In 1979, the NLRB granted the Rosemount Center Workers 
Association the right to represent the Center’s workers, and an NLRB 
election was ordered.  However, the approved voting unit excluded the 
family home mothers.146  The Workers Association objected to the 
exclusion  and contended that the mothers were employees, while the 
Center argued that they were independent contractors and thus rightfully 
excluded.147 
Observing that the mothers’ status depended heavily on whether the 
Center had “retained the right to control the manner and means” by 
which they accomplished their work,148 the NLRB concluded that the 
mothers were Center employees.  In order to work for the Center, the 
mothers had to attend a two-week training session and were contractually 
obligated 
to provide day care on weekdays from 7:30 a.m. to 6 p.m.; to provide 
suitable outdoor and indoor play areas; to provide the children with 
breakfast, lunch, and one afternoon snack; to provide the Employer 
with daily records of attendance; to regularly attend a weekly 3-hour in-
service workshop on child care and development; to be present at all 
                                                     
 142. Id. at 323–24 (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 
(1989)). 
 143. 248 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1980). 
 144. 298 N.L.R.B. 434 (1990). 
 145. Rosemount Center, 248 N.L.R.B. at 1324. 
 146. Id. at 1322. 
 147. Id. at 1323–24. 
 148. Id. at 1324. 
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times while children are in this family home unless a substitute 
authorized by the Center is in attendance and the Center has been 
notified in advance of such absence; to notify the Center’s social work 
supervisor at least 30 days in advance of any planned periodic absence, 
such as vacations, and such absences are not to exceed 10 days per 
year; to comply with all health and dietary standards and all other 
applicable regulations and policies promulgated by the Employer or by 
governmental agencies; and not to provide day care services for any 
child not referred by the Center, except their own children or 
relatives.149 
In addition, the contract between the Center and the mothers specified 
the mothers’ rate of pay indicated that the Center would provide them 
with training and supervision to assure that their services complied with 
the Center’s standards, and stated that the Center would make available 
supplies, such as educational materials, to help the mothers.150  Given the 
Center’s extensive control over the family home mothers’ work, the 
NLRB readily concluded that they were employees, not independent 
contractors. 
2. Cardinal McCloskey’s Children’s & Family Services 
Similar to Rosemount, Cardinal McCloskey involved an NLRB 
determination regarding the status of FCC providers who cared for 
children pursuant to an agreement with a nonprofit organization that 
operated several day care centers.  The centers contracted with a New 
York City government agency to provide day care for families that 
qualified for publicly funded child care services.151  The services were 
provided by teachers who worked at the centers as well as by FCC 
providers recruited to assist the centers.152 
Several factors suggested that the FCC providers were employees of 
the centers.  The providers had to operate during certain proscribed 
hours; they were unable to care for children whose care was not publicly 
funded during those hours; they were unable to hire assistants; they were 
required to post schedules and menus and maintain attendance records; 
they had to attend mandatory training sessions; and they had to make 
sure their homes complied with various safety standards.153  Although 
these factors indicated that “the manner in which the providers furnish 
                                                     
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Cardinal McCloskey’s Children’s & Family Servs., 298 N.L.R.B. 434, 434 (1990). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 435–36. 
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child care service is pervasively and meticulously supervised and 
controlled by the centers,”154 the NLRB ultimately ruled against the 
providers because the centers exercised supervision and control 
“pursuant to [state] regulations and guidelines.”155  The NLRB reasoned 
that, in requiring the providers to comply with state regulations and 
guidelines, the centers were functioning “merely as conduits” and were 
not themselves controlling “the manner and means of the providers’ 
operations.”156 
The intermediary role that the McCloskey centers played between the 
FCC providers and the City of New York distinguishes Rosemount and 
McCloskey.  The control that the Rosemount Center exercised over its 
FCC providers stemmed from center-imposed rules, but in McCloskey, 
the control originated with the City of New York, and the centers simply 
acted to ensure that the FCC providers complied with those rules.157  Of 
course, while this distinction meant that the McCloskey providers did not 
qualify as center employees, it raised the possibility that they were 
employees of the City of New York.  The NLRB in McCloskey 
acknowledged this possibility, without offering additional 
commentary.158 
B. The Analogy of Home Care Workers 
Rosemount and McCloskey offer useful starting points to evaluate 
when a FCC provider may qualify as an employee for purposes of 
collective bargaining.  However, their utility is limited given that both 
cases dealt with private-sector employment.  To initiate a more precise 
analysis of the issue as it applies to public-sector employment, SEIU’s 
campaign to organize home care workers in California again comes into 
play. 
                                                     
 154. Id. at 436. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at 436–37 (commenting that “because the centers’ supervision of the providers is 
effectively limited to ensuring that [state regulatory] requirements are met, the record does not 
indicate that the centers themselves control the manner and means of the providers’ operations”; in 
addition, “the centers [do not] exert authority over the providers that exceeds in any meaningful way 
the controls imposed by [state] regulations”); see also Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. 
NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (commenting that “[g]overnment regulations constitute 
supervision not by the employer but by the state”). 
 157. The status of FCC providers under the NLRA was also at issue in Valley Special Needs 
Program, Inc., No. 6-CA-24051, 1993 WL 1609563 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 16, 1993), adopted as modified 
by 314 N.L.R.B. 903 (1994), where the court concluded that FCC providers were independent 
contractors on facts similar to those in McCloskey. 
 158. See McCloskey, 298 N.L.R.B. at 438 n.18 (“It is not necessary . . . to consider whether the 
providers are employees of the city of New York.  Accordingly, we do not reach that issue.”). 
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As with child care, a great deal of home care is publicly funded.159  
In California, for example, individuals who qualify for government-
funded home care services can select a home care provider whose 
services are paid for by the government.160  The SEIU emphasized the 
public character of home care in its bid to have the workers classified as 
government employees.  When the purported employer—the County of 
Los Angeles—refused to negotiate with the SEIU, legal action was 
commenced against the County.  At issue in the ensuing case, Service 
Employees International Union, Local 434 v. County of Los Angeles,161 
was whether publicly funded home care workers were employees of the 
County under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA),162 the California 
law governing labor relations for local government employees.163 
In support of its position, the SEIU relied upon two earlier cases 
involving the legal status of California home care workers:164 Bonnette v. 
California Health & Welfare Agency165 and In-Home Supportive Services 
v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board.166  Bonnette held that 
government agencies of the State of California, which administered the 
home care services program, were employers of the workers for purposes 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act.167  Specifically, the Bonnette court 
observed that the agencies “exercised considerable control over the 
nature and structure of the employment relationship.”168  In In-Home 
Supportive Services, the court held that the home care workers were state 
employees under California’s workers’ compensation law, and thus 
eligible for benefits for an injury sustained in the course and scope of 
employment.169  In rendering its decision, the court stated that “[t]he 
                                                     
 159. See Delp & Quan, supra note 9, at 2 (“The majority of homecare workers in California is 
paid through an agency of the state government . . . .”). 
 160. Id. at 3 (stating that “consumers directly hire . . . the workers who care for them” and “the 
state IHSS issues the paychecks”). 
 161. 275 Cal. Rptr. 508 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 162. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3500–3511 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006); see also id. § 3505 (requiring 
local governments to “meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment with representatives of . . . recognized employee organizations”). 
 163. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 510. 
 164. Id. at 511–12. 
 165. 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 166. 199 Cal. Rptr. 697 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 167. See Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470 (applying the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–
19 (2002), and concluding the workers were employees). 
 168. Id.; see also id. (observing that the state agencies “controlled the rate and method of 
payment, and that they maintained employment records.  . . . [The agencies] also exercised 
considerable control over the structure and conditions of employment by making the final 
determination, after consultation with the recipient, of the number of hours each [home care] worker 
would work and exactly what tasks would be performed.”). 
 169. See In-Home Supportive Servs., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 702 (concluding that the relationship was 
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county, under the regulatory scheme, has the right to sufficient control 
over the [home care worker] to make the state chargeable, by virtue of 
the agency relationship with the state, as an employer.”170 
In Service Employees International Union, the California Court of 
Appeal concluded that these decisions were not dispositive as both 
involved statutes other than the MMBA.171  Despite a vigorous dissent,172 
the court ultimately ruled against the SEIU, and affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, which had emphasized that: 
[t]he county exercises no supervisory control over [home-care] 
providers.  The manner in which the provider’s tasks are performed is 
determined by the recipient, as are the hours when such services are 
performed.  The provider is free to terminate his or her services without 
notice to the county; likewise, a recipient may discharge a provider at 
any time without notice to the county.  If a provider is not performing 
satisfactorily the county has no right to intervene.  Where the 
recipient’s health or safety is endangered by such unsatisfactory  
 
                                                                                                                       
that of employer and employee). 
 170. Id. at 703 (italics omitted). 
 171. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 434 v. County of L.A., 275 Cal. Rptr. 508, 512 (Ct. 
App. 1990).  The court’s opinion highlights the lack of uniformity within federal law to determine 
who is or is not an employee.  For example, while the NLRA adopts a narrow approach to evaluate 
the existence of an employment relationship, the FLSA adopts a much broader approach.  Compare 
Aetna Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that the test under the 
NLRA is the “right to control test”), with Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1469 (employing the “economic 
reality test” under the FLSA).  This lack of uniformity has drawn considerable criticism from both 
courts and commentators.  As the Third Circuit observed: 
Even when the same person performs the same acts at the same time in the same place 
under the same conditions conceivably he could not be considered an employee under 
some common law standards and some federal statutory definitions while he nevertheless 
could be considered an employee under those of others.  This absence of a universality in 
qualities and definition unavoidably breeds ambiguity and confusion requiring courts to 
assess a broad spectrum of facts in their quest to clarify and determine who is and who is 
not an employee. 
EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 35–36 (3d Cir. 1983); see also REPORT & 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
36, 38 (1994) [hereinafter REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS] (proposing 
the adoption of a unitary “economic realities” test for defining employee status to be “appl[ied] . . . 
across the board in employment and labor law”); Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: 
Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 89–95 (1984) (discussing the varied 
understandings of “employee” in federal employment and labor laws); Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy 
Issues Concerning the Contingent Work Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739, 750 (1995) (arguing 
that “there should be a single definition applicable in all employment and labor law contexts that 
would recognize the distinction between an employee and an independent contractor in a more 
direct, less manipulable manner”). 
 172. See Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 524 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“the county has the right to control the activities of the IHSS providers whether it exercises it or 
not”). 
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performance, the county’s only recourse is to place the recipient in an 
appropriate facility.173 
Under general common law agency principles, the court in Service 
Employees International Union arguably reached the correct decision.  
Apart from compensating the workers, the public agencies had few 
regulations in place that affected job performance.174  As the court noted, 
the right to supervise the workers rested with the individual recipients of 
the services.175 
C. Family Child Care Providers as Employees: The Case of Rhode 
Island 
To date, it appears that only one state, Rhode Island, has seriously 
grappled with whether FCC providers qualify as public employees 
entitled to collective bargaining rights.  Under the Rhode Island Child 
Care Assistance Program,176 working families that earn at or below 225 
percent of the federal poverty level are entitled to child care assistance.177  
If a family is approved for assistance, the state issues a voucher that can 
be used for any approved child care provider, including an FCC provider 
operating a “family day care home.”178  In 2002, Rhode Island licensed 
approximately 1516 child care providers,179 and of that number, 1071 
qualified as family child care homes.180 
To operate a family day care home in Rhode Island, a provider must 
be licensed by the state, which requires compliance with an extensive set 
of regulations “governing character, health, suitability, and 
qualifications; provider/child ratios; workload assignments; procedures 
                                                     
 173. Id. at 511 (majority opinion). 
 174. Id. at 510–11. 
 175. Id. at 511. 
 176. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-5.1-17 (Supp. 2005). 
 177. See id. § 40-5.1-17(a) (“[E]ffective July 1, 1999, the department shall provide appropriate 
child care to such other families whose incomes are at or below two hundred twenty-five percent 
(225%) of the federal poverty line.”).  Rhode Island is the only state that statutorily guarantees the 
provision of child care assistance to all working families with incomes below a certain threshold.  Id. 
§ 40-5.1-17. 
 178. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-72.1-2(10) (1998) (defining a family day care home as “any home 
other than the child’s home in which child day care in lieu of parental care and/or supervision is 
offered at the same time to four (4) or more children who are not relatives of the care giver”). 
 179. CHARLES J. QUIGLEY & ELAINE M. NOTARANTONIO, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RHODE 
ISLAND’S CHILD CARE INDUSTRY 4 (2003), available at http://www.ripolicyanalysis.org/ 
BryantReport.pdf. 
 180. Id. at 5. 
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and practices regarding basic child care and services; and compliance 
with fire and safety codes.”181  For example, to become licensed, an 
applicant must attend a three-hour orientation session,182 submit a 
physician’s statement documenting that she is in good health, comply 
with a criminal background check and place her fingerprints on file with 
the appropriate local enforcement authority, have her home approved by 
the fire inspector and by the health department to ensure compliance with 
state fire codes and applicable health and safety standards,183 and pass a 
home inspection from the state’s Department of Children, Youth and 
Family Services to ensure the home’s suitability as well as the suitability 
of all household members.184  Other regulations specify the type of 
discipline that providers can use,185 restrict providers’ ability to engage in 
other forms of employment,186 require providers to attend periodic 
training sessions,187 and require providers to submit to unannounced 
home visits.188 
In 2004, SEIU Local 1199, together with the Rhode Island Day Care 
Justice Co-operative, an organization that represented the interests of 
over 1000 FCC providers, petitioned the Rhode Island Labor Board 
(RILB) to allow the union to represent the providers pursuant to the 
Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act.189  The SEIU identified various 
Rhode Island state agencies as the providers’ employers.  In hearings 
before the RILB, the state agencies objected to the formation of a 
bargaining unit, arguing that they did not employ the providers.190  In its 
decision, the RILB agreed with the union, holding that the providers 
were state employees and issuing an order to give them the right to 
decide whether to unionize.191  Unfortunately for the providers, the 
                                                     
 181. New Eng. Health Care Employees Union, Local 1199, No. EE- 3671, Home Daycare 
Providers, at 3 (R.I. State Labor Relations Bd. 2004), available at http://www.dlt.state.ri.us/lrb/pdfs/ 
DecisionEE3671.pdf.   
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 4. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  
 186. See id. (“DCYF prohibits providers from engaging in other employment while children are 
in their care and from having children in their care on the morning following all-night 
employment.”). 
 187. See id. (“Providers must demonstrate and document ten hours of approved training every 
two years and must re-certify every two years.”). 
 188. See id. (“DCYF social workers are authorized to make unannounced visits to providers’ 
homes to investigate compliance with DCYF regulations.”). 
 189. Id. at 1.  The Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act is codified in R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-
7-1 to -7-48 (2003). 
 190. New Eng. Health Care Employees Union, No. EE- 3671, at 1. 
 191. Id. at 32–33. 
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Rhode Island Superior Court reversed the RILB’s decision.192  Taken 
together, the two decisions highlight the difficulty of trying to determine 
when FCC providers qualify as employees. 
For the RILB, the state’s “pervasive regulatory presence in the . . . 
home[s]”193 of providers proved determinative: 
[T]he State controls virtually every aspect of providers’ jobs.  It 
controls who becomes a provider; providers’ home and work 
environments; the number of children they may care for; what they may 
feed the children; daily routines with the children; methods of 
discipline; relationships with assistants, if any; and providers’ 
relationships with parents.  Further, the Employer places limits on the 
providers’ work schedules, supervises and reviews providers’ activities 
by requiring them to submit attendance records, requires providers to 
notify the Employer of any changes in their location, status or other 
information and requires providers to maintain specific files on each 
child.  Financial records must also be kept for a specified period of time 
. . . .  [T]he Employer has unfettered access to providers’ homes when a 
complaint has been raised.194 
The state’s level of control over the manner and means by which the 
providers performed their work was so great, reasoned the RILB, that it 
“inexorably” led to the conclusion that they were employees and not 
independent contractors.195 
The majority remained confident in its decision even as three 
members of the seven-person RILB dissented from the opinion.  As the 
dissent saw it, it was impossible for the state to exercise sufficient 
control over the work of the providers to render them employees given 
the location of the work within the providers’ homes.196  The dissent 
raised an important point that deserves further explication.  As noted 
above,197 the location of the work is one of many factors involved in 
determining whether an employment relationship exists.  This factor is 
especially important to family child care because the work occurs within 
                                                     
 192. State v. State Labor Relations Bd., No. C.A. 04-1899, 2005 WL 3059297, at *8 (R.I. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 14, 2005). 
 193. New Eng. Health Care Employees Union, No. EE- 3671, at 25. 
 194. Id. at 28. 
 195. Id.  The RILB’s conclusion that the FCC providers were employees also rested on the 
limited skill required for an individual to work as a provider, the provision of employee benefits to 
providers, and the integral nature of providers’ work to the state agencies.  Id. at 13, 21–22. 
 196. Id. at 2 (Goldstein, dissenting) (“Services are not provided in state owned (or state rented) 
homes.  The state cannot observe the same conditions that exist in commonly used state properties . . 
. .”). 
 197. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text (outlining the factors used to determine 
whether an employer-employee relationship exists). 
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the private sphere of the home.  Under the common law of agency, the 
location of work is intricately linked to the level of control that a putative 
employer exercises.  The law usually ascribes independent contractor 
status to individuals who work at home, or who otherwise labor at a 
location remote from that of the putative employer, since they are not 
subject to the control that comes with day-to-day supervision.198 
Yet while the state did not exercise direct control over the FCC 
providers, it exercised far greater control over them than that which is 
typical of home-based workers.  As the majority observed, a provider 
who cares for a child receiving subsidized care in Rhode Island stands in 
stark contrast to a “true independent contractor” with a home-based work 
site such as a home office, whose workspace is seldom, if ever, subject to 
regulation or inspection by the company with whom she does business.199  
By contrast, Rhode Island heavily regulates the homes of FCC providers 
who provide care for subsidized children: 
[H]omes must have 35 square feet of play/work space available for 
each child within the home; there must be an area for outdoor play 
which is safe from hazards; there are limitations on the use of porches 
above the first floor; there must be a separation of functions from room 
to room; hot water may not be set higher than 120 degrees; electrical 
outlets must be covered when not in use; the heating system must be 
capable of maintaining a minimum temperature of 65 degrees; there 
must be a working telephone at all times; emergency phone numbers 
must be posted and clearly visible; there must be a first aid kit on the 
premises with a specific inventory of items; there must be an 
emergency evacuation plan and it must be practiced monthly; the 
refrigerator must be maintained at 45 degrees or less; drugs, medicines 
and cleaning materials must be stored in specific [containers, and] 
stairways must be gated; doors and windows must be securely 
screened; no peeling paint or plaster is permitted and domestic animals 
must be vaccinated and away from the children.200 
                                                     
 198. See Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and Its Impact on 
the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 347 
(2003) (discussing the rise of home-based computer workers and considering whether they are 
independent contractors under the NLRA); Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economic Relationship 
Appropriate for Collective Bargaining, 39 B.C. L. REV. 329, 335 (1998) (observing that the right-to-
control test enables employers “to exclude from the Act’s coverage workers, such as traveling sales 
personnel, delivery drivers and taxicab drivers, whose mobility makes direct supervision 
infeasible”); Hiroshi Motomura, Comment, Employees and Independent Contractors Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 278, 289 (1977) (citing Am. Broad. Co., 117 
N.L.R.B. 13, 18 (1957)) (discussing the NLRB’s conclusion that musicians, who worked out of their 
own homes, were independent contractors because supervision was absent). 
 199. New Eng. Health Care Employees Union, No. EE- 3671, at 15. 
 200. Id. at 14–15. 
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Thus, even as the providers were not subject to day-to-day supervision, 
the state nevertheless tightly controlled the manner and means of their 
work, as well as their working environment. 
On appeal, the Superior Court brushed over this point, concluding 
with little explanation that the state’s authority over FCC providers 
equated not with control but simply with the power to enforce 
compliance with regulatory rules.201  Such a distinction is clearly 
warranted in certain contexts as, for example, in the earlier discussion of 
McCloskey where the child care centers at issue functioned as conduits to 
ensure that the centers’ FCC providers complied with state regulations.202  
In a situation, however, where the state is itself the alleged employer, as 
opposed to a third party as was true in McCloskey, the question remains 
as to whether the state, by way of its regulations, effectively controls the 
manner and means of the providers’ operations.  Unfortunately, the court 
ignored this question. 
However, even if the Rhode Island FCC providers had prevailed 
before the court, the control test is ultimately far too unpredictable to 
assure a favorable outcome for other licensed FCC providers who lack 
control over how they perform their work.  Fraught with uncertainty and 
difficulty, the control test is often a poor measure for determining 
employee or independent contractor status.203  As numerous 
commentators have remarked, application of the control test often serves 
to deny collective bargaining rights to workers who lack adequate 
individual bargaining leverage and thus need protection under applicable 
collective bargaining statutes.204 
                                                     
 201. State v. State Labor Relations Bd., No. C.A. 04-1899, 2005 WL 3059297, at *7 (R.I. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 14, 2005). 
 202. See supra notes 151–58 and accompanying text. 
 203. See, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When it Sees One 
and How it Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 361 (2001) (observing that 
“the control test sometimes leads to uncertain results, because an employer’s control over one aspect 
of the employment relationship may be offset by a lack of control over some other aspect”); id. at 
340 (commenting that “the degree and nature of employer control is hopelessly elusive”); Dowd, 
supra note 171, at 85 (commenting that the control test “fails to distinguish between an individual 
who essentially contracts with the employer from a relatively equal bargaining position and the 
worker who is involved in an ongoing relationship in which significant direct or indirect control is 
retained by the employer.  In the latter relationship, bargaining power with respect to the terms and 
conditions of employment rests almost entirely with the employer.”); Hiatt, supra note 171, at 749–
50 (discussing how companies engaged in contract hiring manipulate the control test); Motomura, 
supra note 198, at 295 (commenting that the right-to-control test has failed to yield “a coherent, 
well-formulated set of principles for distinguishing independent contractors and employees”). 
 204. See, e.g., Hiatt, supra note 171, at 739 (commenting on the classification of “minimum-
wage” home care workers as independent contractors); Marc Linder, Towards Universal Worker 
Coverage Under the National Labor Relations Act: Making Room for Uncontrolled Employees, 
Dependent Contractors, and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 555, 594–96 (1989) 
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FCC providers who deliver subsidized care would stand a far better 
chance of being classified as employees if collective bargaining rights 
hinged not on the control test, but on a test that accorded centrality to the 
economic status of the worker vis-à-vis her relationship with a putative 
employer.  In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,205 the Supreme Court 
articulated such an approach to govern the determination of an employee 
under the NLRA.206  The approach, often referred to as the economic-
reality test, recognizes that workers, such as FCC providers who work at 
home, can still be economically dependent on the entities for which they 
work, “even absent traditional looking-over-the-shoulder physical 
control.”207 
Evaluated in terms of economic dependence, it becomes clear that 
FCC providers who deliver subsidized care far more closely resemble 
employees than independent contractors.  Importantly, they lack the type 
of attributes typically associated with independent contractors.  They 
neither have access to the means of production that would enable them to 
function as capitalists nor do they possess a scarce marketable skill.208  
As noted earlier, such providers are overwhelmingly poor and rarely 
viewed as skilled workers.209  Unlike an independent contractor, whose 
income is based upon profits realized from capital, state-paid FCC 
providers primarily function as wage laborers.  They offer only their 
services, caring for children, in exchange for a wage from the state, and 
they lack the bargaining power to ensure that the wages received are 
reasonable. 
While the economic-reality test was short-lived under the NLRA,210 
it is arguably far more consistent than is the control test, with collective 
bargaining’s goal of redressing the fundamental inequality of bargaining 
                                                                                                                       
[hereinafter Linder, Toward Universal Worker Coverage] (discussing how taxi companies 
manipulate the control test to deny collective bargaining rights to leased taxi drivers); Marc Linder, 
What Is an Employee? Why It Does, But Should Not, Matter, 7 LAW & INEQ. 155, 181–82 (1989) 
[hereinafter Linder, What Is an Employee?] (listing groups of workers with limited bargaining power 
who may be classified as independent contractors and thus excluded from the protection of labor 
laws). 
 205. 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
 206. See id. at 129 (stating that the NLRB, when making a determination, should consider the 
“underlying economic facts rather than . . . [making a determination] technically and exclusively by 
previously established legal classifications”). 
 207. Linder, Toward Universal Worker Coverage, supra note 204, at 601. 
 208. Linder, What Is an Employee?, supra note 204, at 162. 
 209. See supra notes 70–74, 87–89 and accompanying text (discussing the economic status and 
social perceptions of FCC providers). 
 210. Congress expressed its clear disapproval of the Hearst decision and its use of the economic-
reality test in enacting the Taft-Hartley Amendments.  See supra note 138; see also Carlson, supra 
note 203, at 321–25 (discussing the congressional response to Hearst). 
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power between workers and management.  Developed as a tort law 
principle, the control test’s distinction between employees and 
independent contractors represents a rational approach for assessing 
“whether a firm has vicarious liability for the wrongs committed by those 
who may be advancing the firm’s interests.”211  However, “[a]s a test for 
determining which workers should be able to bargain collectively with a 
firm whose interests they advance, . . . it [often] makes no sense at 
all.”212  By anchoring the employee-independent contractor distinction on 
who controls the manner and means of work, the test provides an 
incentive for businesses to manipulate work settings so as to give 
workers superficial control, such that they no longer qualify as rights-
bearing employees.213  Yet all too often, the business retains the power to 
determine the terms and conditions of the working relationship.214 
As Professor Marc Linder queries, “[a]s long as employers control 
the working conditions that workers want improved, why should it 
matter whether they tell them how to work?”215  This Article echoes 
Linder’s position that it should not matter.  Even if FCC providers are in 
some sense entrepreneurial, as economically marginalized workers, they 
should still enjoy collective bargaining rights under applicable state 
collective bargaining laws.  While the economic-reality test is far more 
amenable to this proposition than the control test, commentators point 
out that it also involves uncertainty in its application.216 
An alternative approach is to create a dependent contractor category 
that would confer collective bargaining rights on workers who are 
“economically so dependent on the entities for which they work that they 
                                                     
 211. Harper, supra note 198, at 334; see also Dowd, supra note 171, at 98–100 (discussing the 
control test’s historical foundation as a tort law concept). 
 212. Harper, supra note 198, at 334; see also REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS, supra note 171, at 37 (commenting that the test “is based on a nineteenth century 
concept whose purposes are wholly unrelated to contemporary employment policy”). 
 213. Harper, supra note 198, at 334–35. 
 214. Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An 
Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
187, 198 (1999). 
 215. Id. at 201; see also Carlson, supra note 203, at 299 (“The difficulty of defining ‘employee’ . 
. . leads to what ought to have been the first question for legislators: why should employee status 
matter at all?”). 
 216. See Carlson, supra note 203, at 342 (“The economic realities test certainly allows the 
inclusion of some workers within a modern meaning of ‘employee,’ but the test is no more 
predictable, and probably less so, than a simple control test.”); Lewis L. Maltby & David C. 
Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case for Amending Federal Employment 
Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 262 (1997) (“[T]he 
economic realities test is an improvement on the common-law test, but it does not go far enough in 
recognizing the structural changes in the American workforce and protecting the growing number of 
workers who do not fall into older, more traditional patterns of employment.”). 
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are effectively precluded from competing as capital accumulators.”217  
Such an approach recognizes that even though some workers may not fit 
the traditional definition of an employee, they also do not possess the 
type of skill, capital, or bargaining power that characterizes independent 
contractors.  Designation of an FCC provider as a dependent contractor 
would enable her, in conjunction with other providers, to bargain with 
the state to achieve socially acceptable terms and conditions of the labor 
relationship. 
Absent the creation of a dependent contractor category, FCC 
providers who serve families receiving subsidized child care are left with 
the uncertainty of the control test, and the limited likelihood that courts 
will look favorably upon claims that they are essentially de facto state 
employees.  Consequently, as a practical matter, labor should consider 
alternative approaches to organize and represent FCC providers.  The 
next Part examines one such approach that has met with considerable 
success. 
VI. AN EMPLOYER-OF-RECORD APPROACH 
Although antitrust law generally prohibits independent contractors 
from engaging in collective bargaining, such bargaining may be 
permissible if approved by the state.  Articulated in Parker v. Brown,218 
the state-action doctrine allows states to carve out immunities from the 
federal antitrust statutes.219  Thus, an alternative avenue to organize and 
represent FCC providers is to press for legislation granting providers 
collective bargaining rights despite the absence of a traditional 
employment relationship.  The legislation would designate a state agency 
as an employer of record for FCC providers for the purpose of collective 
bargaining.  In order to qualify for the state-action exemption, the 
legislation must satisfy a two-prong test.220  First, it must affirmatively 
                                                     
 217. Linder, Toward Universal Worker Coverage, supra note 204, at 601; see also Maltby & 
Yamada, supra note 216, at 266 (suggesting a comparable approach in the context of discrimination 
statutes such that independent contractors would be covered); Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint for 
Reform of the National Labor Relations Act, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517, 562 (1994) (“[I]t might be 
appropriate to provide express coverage of ‘dependent contractors’ where the individuals involved 
exhibit a dependent economic relationship to a single company not unlike that of wage-earners.”); 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Should Some Independent Contractors Be Redefined as “Employees” Under 
Labor Law?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1032–34 (1988) (discussing the “dependent contractor” concept 
in Canadian law). 
 218. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 219. Id. at 351.  See generally PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, I ANTITRUST LAW 
(2d ed. 2000) (explaining “state action” immunity). 
 220. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) 
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express a clearly articulated state policy to supplant competition with a 
regulatory scheme.221  Second, the legislation must provide for adequate 
and active state supervision to ensure that the antitrust immunity 
represents the state’s own interests, and not merely those of a private 
party.222 
A. Home Care Workers: Charting the Path 
Use of the state-action doctrine to secure bargaining rights for low-
wage service workers, deemed independent contractors, gained 
prominence in the context of the aforementioned SEIU campaign to 
organize California home care workers.  Following its unsuccessful 
attempt to persuade the California courts that home care workers were 
employees under the MMBA,223 SEIU turned to the state legislature.  
After months of coalition lobbying by SEIU and various consumer 
groups,224 the California legislature passed a law in 1992 that authorized 
each county in the state to create “public authorities”—agencies that 
would serve as the legal employer for the home care workers within the 
county with respect to state collective bargaining laws.225  In 1997, 
pursuant to the law, Los Angeles County created a public authority that 
functions as the employer of record for the county’s home care 
workers.226 
Two years later, SEIU achieved the largest union victory in the 
United States since 1941 when it successfully organized 74,000 home 
                                                                                                                       
(setting forth two standards for antitrust immunity), overruled in part by Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 
U.S. 34, 46 (1985) (“[T]he active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in 
which the actor is a municipality.”); see also S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 48, 57–62 (1985) (holding the two-prong test applicable to private party claims of 
state-action immunity). 
 221. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (citing City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 
410 (1978). 
 222. See S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 471 U.S. at 56–57 (“This supervision requirement 
prevents the State from frustrating the national policy in favor of competition by casting a ‘gauzy 
cloak of state involvement’ over what is essentially private anticompetitive conduct.” (quoting 
Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106)). 
 223. See supra notes 161–75 and accompanying text (discussing SEIU’s attempts to convince 
the California courts that home care workers were state employees). 
 224. See HEINRITZ-CANTERBURY, supra note 9, at 11 (identifying key groups lobbying for the 
legislation: the SEIU and members of the disability and senior communities). 
 225. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12301.6 (West Supp. 2006).  In 1999, the California 
legislature enacted a law that required all California counties to “act as or establish an employer” for 
IHSS workers.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12302.25(a) (West Supp. 2006). 
 226. Delp & Quan, supra note 9, at 11. 
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care workers in Los Angeles.227  Between 2000 and 2003, SEIU 
organized a total of 290,000 home care workers throughout the 
country.228  The home care campaign has achieved tangible successes.  
For example, a recent study of unionization effects on home care in San 
Francisco indicates that the wages of workers have almost doubled, and 
job turnover has dropped significantly.229  In Oregon, unionization has 
led to paid health insurance for workers, paid vacation time, increased 
wages, and coverage under the state’s workers compensation system.230 
B. Success in Illinois 
In 2005, Illinois became the first state to pass legislation that extends 
bargaining rights to FCC providers and immunizes them from federal 
antitrust liability.231  In February 2005, the Governor of Illinois signed an 
executive order232 granting collective bargaining rights to FCC providers 
under the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act,233 and immunizing their 
bargaining activity from antitrust liability.234  Later that year the Illinois 
legislature passed a law that echoed the sentiments of the executive order 
and provided that: 
[F]or the purposes of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor 
Relations Act, child and day care home providers, including licensed 
                                                     
 227. Id. at 2; Schneider, supra note 115, at 26. 
 228. SERV. EMPLOYEES INT’L UNION, SEIU HEALTH CARE DIVISION REPORT, BUILDING A 
NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR QUALITY CARE 3 (2004), available at http://www.seiu1984.org/ 
appResources/scDocs/HealthDivision.Rpt.pdf; see also Schneider, supra note 115, at 27 (noting the 
unionization of “almost 300,000 home care workers” in California, Oregon, and Washington). 
 229. Candace Howes, Upgrading California’s Home Care Workforce: The Impact of Political 
Action and Unionization, in THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA LABOR, 2004, at 71, 92–98 (2004), available 
at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=ile; see also Patrice M. 
Mareschal, Agitation and Control: A Tactical Analysis of the Campaign Against New Jersey’s 
Quality Home Care Act (May 21, 2005) (presented at the Caring Labor Conference, Harry Bridges 
Center for Labor Studies), available at http://www.depts.washington.edu/pcls/Mareschalpaper.pdf 
(“Unionization and the establishment of public authorities have produced a substantial improvement 
in pay and benefits throughout Washington and Oregon, as well as in California’s larger cities and 
suburbs.”). 
 230. Schneider, supra note 115, at 26. 
 231. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-11(b-5) (West Supp. 2006). 
 232. Exec. Order No. 2005-1, 29 Ill. Reg. 3386 (Feb. 18, 2005). 
 233. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/1 (West 2005).  For useful commentary on the law, see 
Barbara Rose, Union for Child-care Workers, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2005, at C1 (discussing the Illinois 
child care providers’ election to join SEIU).  See also Brooks, supra note 122, at 52–53 (discussing 
SEIU’s work on behalf of FCC providers before the State of Illinois officially recognized the order 
and the governor signed the executive order). 
 234. Exec. Order No. 2005-1, 29 Ill. Reg. at 3387. 
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and license exempt, participating in the Department’s child care 
assistance program shall be considered to be public employees and the 
State of Illinois shall be considered to be their employer . . . .  The State 
shall engage in collective bargaining with an exclusive representative 
of child and day care home providers participating in the child care 
assistance program concerning their terms and conditions of 
employment that are within the State’s control.235 
Notably, the law applies to both licensed and license-exempt providers 
who participate in the state’s child care assistance program.236  Under the 
law, the state is regarded as the employer of FCC providers solely for the 
purpose of collective bargaining.237  As mandatory subjects of bargaining 
include “any matter with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of 
employment, not specifically provided for in any other law or not 
specifically in violation of the provisions of any law,”238 FCC providers 
now have the right to participate in the determination of provider 
reimbursement rates. 
The Illinois legislature was careful to satisfy the first requirement of 
the state-action doctrine by expressing the state’s clear intent to displace 
market competition with a regulatory scheme: “In according child and 
day care home providers and their selected representative rights under 
the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, the State intends that the State 
action exemption to application of federal and State antitrust laws be 
fully available . . . .”239  Under the second prong of the state-action 
doctrine, state officials must “have and exercise power to review 
particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those 
that fail to accord with state policy.”240  The legislation also satisfies this 
prong as the state will be involved in negotiations with a representative 
of the FCC providers, and any collective bargaining agreement reached 
must necessarily have met with the state’s approval.241 
                                                     
 235. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-11(b-5) (West Supp. 2006). 
 236. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/3(f) (West Supp. 2006). 
 237. See id. 315/3(o) (“The State shall not be considered to be the employer of child and day 
care home providers for any purposes not specifically provided in this amendatory Act . . . , 
including but not limited to, purposes of vicarious liability in tort and purposes of statutory 
retirement or health insurance benefits.”). 
 238. Id. 315/7. 
 239. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-11(c) (West Supp. 2006). 
 240. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988). 
 241. As Professor Herbert Hovenkamp points out, the supervision prong requires that “the state 
itself, rather than a private party, is the effective decision maker.”  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,  supra 
note 219, at 477.  Even as it is to be expected that FCC providers will have staked out their position 
on issues of importance before heading to the bargaining table, the ultimate agreement can properly 
be regarded as the “State’s own” since the collective bargaining process ensures that the State has 
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Following enactment of the law, 49,000 FCC providers in Illinois 
elected to have the SEIU represent them in negotiations with the state.242  
The election, which was the second largest union victory achieved since 
1941, was the largest child care election in United States history.243  In 
December 2005, the providers announced the details of their first 
contract with the state.244  Key provisions of the contract include access 
to affordable health care for providers,245 incentives for providers to 
acquire training in early education,246 and an increase in the 
reimbursement rate paid to FCC providers.247 
Both SEIU and AFSCME are pursuing a comparable strategy to 
organize and represent FCC providers in other states, including 
California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.248  Thus far, governors in two 
additional states, Oregon249 and Iowa,250 have signed executive orders 
                                                                                                                       
“played a substantial role in determining the specifics of the economic policy.”  FTC v. Ticor Title 
Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992). 
 242. Comerford & Huq, supra note 71, at 1; Rose, supra note 233, at C1. 
 243. Comerford & Huq, supra note 71, at 1. 
 244. Press Release, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 49,000 Family Child Care Providers Negotiate 
Historic Contract in IL to Raise Standard for Quality Care Services (Dec. 13, 2005), http:// 
www.seiu.org/media/pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1275 [hereinafter SEIU Press Release]; see also 
Stephen Franklin, Illinois Agrees to Labor Pact on Child Care, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 2005, at 3. 
 245. See SEIU Press Release, supra note 244 (“The state and the union will work together to 
determine eligibility requirements and plan details. The state has committed to a $27 million 
investment in funding in year three of the contract.”). 
 246. See id. (“Incentives for additional training in early education—up to 20 percent in extra pay 
to encourage providers to enhance their effectiveness as early educators and improve school 
readiness.”). 
 247. See id. (“Rate hikes to stem turnover—providers’ base subsidy rates—which now are as 
low as $9.48 per child per day—will increase an average of 35 percent over the three years of the 
contract to help encourage qualified providers to enter and stay in child care.”). 
 248. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Illinois Child Care Victory, 
www.seiu.org/public/child_care/il_providers_unite.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2006). 
 249. Exec. Order No. 05-10, 44-11 Or. Bull. 4 (Nov. 1, 2005).  The executive order provides that 
[t]he Director of the Department of Human Services and the Director of the Employment 
Department . . . shall meet and confer with AFSCME Council 75, on behalf of certified 
and registered family child care providers, regarding issues of mutual concern.  Such 
issues of mutual concern may include, but are not limited to, training and certification 
requirements, reimbursement rates, payment procedures, health and safety conditions, 
and any other changes to current practice that would improve recruitment and retention of 
qualified[,] certified[,] and registered family child care providers, that would improve the 
quality of the programs they provide, or that would encourage exempt providers to seek 
to become certified or registered providers. 
Id.; see also Steve Law, Day-Care, STATESMAN JOURNAL (Salem, Or.), Sept. 1, 2005, at 1C 
(discussing the possibility of Oregon in-home day-care providers unionizing). 
 250. See Exec. Order No. 45, 29 Iowa Admin. Bull. 370 (2006) (directing the Department of 
Human Services to meet with authorized representatives of registered FCC providers in Iowa); Exec. 
Order No. 46, 29 Iowa Admin. Bull. 373 (2006) (directing the Department of Human Services to 
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extending collective bargaining rights to FCC providers who serve 
families receiving publicly subsidized care.  And in Washington, 





Family child care is a critical component of child care in America.  
The popularity of family child care, especially for low-income 
communities and for poor women transitioning from welfare to work, 
has understandably heightened concern over the quality of such care, the 
lack of provider training, and the need for increased government 
regulation.  Sustainable, long-term progress on these fronts requires a 
comprehensive approach that appreciates the link between improved 
child care quality and transformation of family child care into a decent 
job.  As long as providers earn poverty-level wages and lack the 
resources to afford benefits such as health insurance, the problems of 
poor quality of care and high turnover rates among providers will persist. 
While figuring out how to best resolve America’s child care problem 
is a complicated task, this Article has argued that the labor movement 
can help assure that the solution reflects the interests and perspectives of 
FCC providers as well as the interests of children in child care.  Whether 
unions challenge the classification of providers as independent 
contractors under existing labor laws or advocate for the creation of new 
laws that classify providers as employees for the purpose of collective 
bargaining, the ultimate goal is the same: to allow providers a voice in 
determining the terms and conditions under which they provide care, on 
behalf of the states, to children whose families receive child care 
subsidies. 
                                                                                                                       
meet with authorized representatives of unregistered FCC providers in Iowa); see also DeWitte, 
supra note 5 (stating that AFSCME claimed victory in a vote to decide which union would represent 
Iowa child care providers); Charlotte Eby, Union Says It Will Lead Efforts for Iowa’s Child Care 
Providers, WATERLOO-CEDAR FALLS COURIER (Iowa), Feb. 7, 2006, at A7 (stating that Iowa’s child 
care workers had voted to join a union); Jacobs, supra note 5 (discussing the two executive orders). 
 251. See S.B. 6165, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006) (“AN ACT Relating to improving access 
to and the stability of quality child care through providing collective bargaining and other 
representation rights for family child care providers and licensees.”); H.B. 2353, 59th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 2006) (same). 
